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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2543 
PEOPLES LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY, Plaintiff in 
Error, 
versus 
GRACE PARKER, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
SUPERSEDEAS. 
To the Honorable Justices of the 811,preme Court of .App-eals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Peoples Life Insurance Company, respect-
fully represents unto the Court that it is aggrieved by a final 
judgment of the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia, rendered against your petitioner on the 
21st day of July, 1941, in an action at law in which Grace 
Parker was plaintiff, and your petitione·r was defend ... 
ant. 
2• *The transcript of the record with the original exhibit 
is herewith presented. The parties will be ref erred to 
according to the positions occupied by them in the Court be-
low. 
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STATEMENT OF PROCEjjJDINGS IN THE LOWER 
CQURT. 
This is an action at law brought by notice of motion. Grace 
Parker sued Peoples Life Insurance Company on 'Y'hat slw 
claimed to have been an oral contract of life insurance upon 
the life of her husband, Gordon P&,rker. The defendant filed 
a plea of general issue and a plea of tender of the returu 
of the premium. Upon the trial the jury returned a verdict 
for the plaintiff for $1,000.00. Thereupon the defendant 
moved the Court to set aside the verdict and render final 
judgment for the defendant. The Court overruled the mo-
tion and rendered final judgment for the plaintiff on the ver-
dict. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF E-RROR. 
Your petitioner assigns the following errors : 
(1) The Court erred in excluding the testimony of ·wmiam 
L. Bersuabam in reference to the rejection of" the applica-
tion. See M. R., pp. 49-54. 
(2) The Court erred in granting Instruction 1-P, offered 
by the plaintiff. 
3* * (3) The Court erred in refusing instructions A, B 
and C offered bv the defendant. 
( 4) The Court er~ed in refusing· to set aside the verdict. 
and to render final judgment for the defendant; and erred 
in rendering final judgment for the plaintiff. 
FACTS. 
On the evening· of January 7, 1941, C. L. Sowell, solicitor of 
the defendant insurance company, called at the Park~r home 
in the City of Norfolk to try to interest Mr. Gordon Parker 
in ta.king out a policy of insurance on his· (Parker's) Jife. 
The plaintiff and several other wifoesses who were present. 
at the interview testified that the solicitor So,vell told Parker 
that if he would sign the application for the policy, he, Parker, 
W()uld be covered immediately from the· signing· of the ap-
plication. Mr. Sowell denied that he so stated. · 
· · 1\fr. Parker sig·ni:fied his willingness· to purchase $500.00 
insurance, and was told by Sowell that it was necessary for 
him to sign an application for it. Mr. Sowell delivered the 
application to l\f r. Parker, which Parker signed. The evi-
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dence is silent as to whether Parker read the application, 
though he had time to do so. 
48 ~The application above the signature of Parker is as 
follows: 
"I hereby apply for insurance for the amount herein named, 
and I declare and warrant that the answers to the foregoing 
and following questions are complete and true, and were writ-
ten opposite the respective questions by me, or strictly in 
accordance with my direc.tions. I ag-ree that said answers, 
with this declaration, shall fonu the basis of a contract of 
insurance between me and Peoples Life Insurance Company, 
and that the policy which may be granted by the Company 
in pursuance of this application shall be accepted subject to 
the conditions and agreements contained in such policy. I 
further agree that no obligation shall exist against said 
Company on account of tbi~ application, althoug·h I may have 
paid premiums thereon, unless said Company shall issu~ a 
policy in pursuance thereof, and the same is delivered to 
me.'' 
Attention 1s especially invited to the last sentence in the 
above. The application is certified as an original exhibit 
"Defendant's Exhibit l." In the application it was further 
stated that the plaintiff, Grace Parker, (wife) was to be the 
beneficiary. 
After the sig-ning of the application Mrs. Parker paid to 
the solicitor $2.17 for tl1e first month's premium and received 
a receipt therefor. 
5* • As stated the application was signed on January 7th, 
which was Tuesday. . On the following Tuesday, January 
14th, Mr. Parker met an accidental death resulting· from n 
scaffold breaking. If the policy had been issued it would 
have contained a. provision for double indemnity in case of 
accidental death. 
The evidence shows that according- to the rules and custom 
of the company a.11 applications for insurance had to be 
passed upon by the home office of the company in Washing·-
ton, D. C. It was the custom to send applications to Wash-
ington once a week; that is on Saturday applications received 
after the previous Saturday were sent to Washington. Iu-
asmuch as the application in tho instant case was signed in 
Norfolk on ,January 7th, which was Tuesday, it was mailed 
to Washington on Saturday, January 11th, and hence could 
not have been received in Washington prior to January 13th. 
As heretofore stated Mr. Parker died on January 14th. 
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The evidence shows that it was the custom of the home 
office in Washington to take about a week to investigate ap-
plications. Upon the receipt of the application in the in-
stant case in Washington, in accordance with the usual com .se 
it was referred to an investigator for a report. The report 
of the investigator was submitted, and from the report it was 
determined that the application should be rejected. The 
application was rejected, and so stamped upon its face; and 
no policy was issued. Thereupon Mrs. Parker was notified 
of the rejection, and the Company tendered the return 
6* of the •$2.17 which :Mrs. Parker refused. 
The evidence further shows that in accordance with 
the rules and custom of the company, if the policy had been 
issued it would not have been dated as of the date of the 
application, but rather as of the actual issuance of the policy, 
and that the premium paid would be applied not from the 
date of the application, but from the date of the policy. . 
The evidence is also clear that the solicitor, C. L. Sowell, 
had no authority to bind the company upon the risk, that 
he knew he had no such authority, and knew that he had to 
submit all applications to the home office for acceptance or 
rejection. 
QUESTION INVOLVED ON THIS APPEAL. 
The question involved on this appeal is whether the al-
leged insurance became effective upon the life of Mr. Parker, 




Language of the Application is Clear. 
It should be noted that no policy was ever issued. After 
the sales talk, and after Mr. Parker indicated *his will-
7* ingness to purchase insurance, he was told by the solicitor 
that it was necessary for him to si.hrn an application fo1· 
the policy; and Mr. Parker did sign the application. Tbat 
n pplication contained the following· laugnag·e above the sig·11a-
ture of Mr. Parker: 
"I further agree that no obligation shall exist against said 
Company on account of. tl1is application, although I may have 
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paid premiums thereon, unless said Company shall issue a 
policy in pursuance thereof, and the same is delivered to 
me.'' 
Is the above lang,.mge ambiguous? To read the words 
is to answer the question. The language is clear and the 
meaning plain. Nothing· could be clearer and there is nothing 
to explain. 
II. 
Prior or Contemporaneous Parol Statem,ents Not Permitted 
to Vary the Terms of a Written .Agreement. 
Th~ application constitutes a written agreement. Con-
tracts of insurance are not of such a nature as to allow the 
law of contracts applicable thereto to be interpreted differ-
ently from the law as applied to other contracts. It is true 
that insurance contracts, being written by the insurance 
company, will be strictly construed against the company. 
But the written words cannot be ignored or changed 
8* "in insurance contracts to me·an something entirely dif-
ferent from that which is definitelv and clearlv stated. 
The terms of a written agreement;· proposal or contract 
cannot be varied by parol evidence of prior or contempo-
raneous statements or representations, where the language 
in the written instrument is clear and unambiguous. · This is 
just as true a statement as applied to insurance as to any 
other written agreement. 
Home Ins. Oo. v. Gwathmey, 82 Va. 923. 
Va. F. ~ M. Ins. Oo. v. Mor.qan., 90 Va. 290. 
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 1'18 Va. 418. 
If parol evidence of prior or contemporaneous statements 
could be introduced to change or vary a clear written con-
tract or proposal, one could well imagine the chaotic condition 
the world of today would be in. There would be no certainty 
of the contract and business could not rely upon its written 
~1g-reements, as they would be subject to change or repudia-
tion by either party. Such a state of affairs would open the 
doors to fraud of all kinds and allow those people without 
conscience or morals to repudiate their contracts or to claim 
contracts never intended. 
In the case of New York Life Insu,rance Co·mpany v. 
Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, -the Court said: 
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"It wo:ul~ introduce great uncertainty in all business trans·-
actions if a party making· written proposals for a contra t,. 
with representations to induae its execu,tions should b~ 
. 9* allowed *to show, after it has been obtained, that he did. 
not know the contents of his proposals, and to enforce-
it notwithstanding· their falsity as to matters essential to 
its obligation and validity. Contracts could not be made, 
or business fairly conducted if such a rule prevailed; and 
there is no reason why it g}10uld be applied merely to insur-
ance con tracts.'' 
That case was quoted with approval in Roya! Insurance 
Company v. Poole, 148 Va. 363 a!!-4 Provident Relief Associa. 
tion v. Butts, 158 Va. 259. 
III. 
To Hold the Company Liable on the Alle_qed Representa.tions 
of the Solicito1· 1Vould Sanctfon, a Praud Upon the 
Company Perpetrated by the Solicitor. 
Inasmuc~ as the verdict was _for the plaintiff it must be 
admitted that the solicitor, C. L. Sowell, in ·his sales talk 
told :M:r. Parker that if he would sign the application the 
insurance would immediately be effective. Sowell knew that 
he had no authority to so bind the company, and knew that 
it was necessary to obtain a written application and for,varcl 
the same to the home office in Washing-ton for acceptance 
or rejection. The evidence is clear that after the sales talk 
Sowell told Parker that it was necessary for him to sign 
an application, that he delivered the blank *application 
10* to Parker, and that Parker signed it. The application 
contained the following·: 
''I further agree tha.t no obligation shall exist against said 
Company on account of this a.pplication, altl;iough I may have 
paid premiums thereon, unless said Company shall issue a 
policy in pursuance thereof, and the same is delivered to 
me." 
It seetns clea.1· therefore that. Sowell did not have anv au-
thority to bind the risk; and to allow the agent to so "bind 
the principal would be to approve fraud on the part of the 
agent, i~1 which the applicant participated. That there could 
be no liability on the part of the insurance c.ompany in such 
a case is held in the following cases : · 
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Royal Ins. Co. v. Poole, 148 Va. 363. 
Provident Relief Assn. v. Butts, 158 Va. 259. 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519. 
Ryan v. World Mi1,tual Life Ins. C.o., 41 Conn. 168, 19 Am. 
Rep. 490. 
Those cases cannot be distinguished from the case at bar. 
The following· extract from the opinion of Mr. Justice Field 
in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U.S. 519, is quoted 
with approval in both Royal Insurance Compa.ny v. Poole., 
148 Va. 363 (at page 370), and Provident Relief .Assn. v. Butts, 
158 Va. 259, ( a.t page 263). 
''Mr. Justic.e lt,ield speaking· for the court, said: 'It 
l 1 * is conceded that the statements •and representations 
contained in the answers, as written, of the assured to 
the questions propounded to him in his application, respect-
ing his past and present health, were material to the risk 
to be assumed by the company, and that the insurance was 
made upon the faith ·of them, and upon his agTeement ac-
companying them that, if they were false in any respect, the 
policy to be issued upon them should be void. It is sought 
to meet and overcome tl1e force of this conceded fact by proof 
that he never made the statements and representations to 
which his name is signed; that he truthfully answered those 
questions; tha11 false answers written by an agent of the com-
pany were inserted in place of those actually given, and were 
forwarded with the application to the home office; and i.t is 
contended that, such proof being- made, the plaintiff is not 
estopped from recovering.' 
"And then the court proceeds to wipe aside this contention 
as follows: 'But on tl1e assumption that the fact as to the 
answers was as stated, and that no further obligation rested 
upon the assured in connection with the policy, it is not easy 
to perceive how the company can be precluded from setting 
up their falsity, or how any rights upon the policy ever ac-
crued to him. It is, of course, not necessary to arg·ne that 
the agent had no authority from the company to falsify the 
answers, or that the assured could acquire no right by virtue 
of his falsified answers. Both he and the company were de-
ceived by the fraudulent conduct of the agent. The 
12* assured •was placed in the position of making false 
representations in order to secure a valuable contract, 
which, upon a truthful report of l1is condition, could not have 
been obtained. By them the company was imposed upon antl 
induced to enter into the contract. In such a case, assuming 
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that both parties acted in good faith, justice would require 
that the contract be cancelled and the premiums returned. 
As the present action is not for such a cancellation, the only 
recovery which the plaintiff could properly have upon the 
facts he asserts, taken in connection with the limitation upon 
the powers of the agent, is for the amount of the premium~ 
paid, and to that only would he be entitled by virtue of the 
statute of Missouri. 
'' 'But the case as presented by the record is by no means 
as favorable to him as we have assumed.' (And all tha1. 
follows is equally true in the instant case.) 'It was his duty 
to read the application he sig11ed. He knew that upon it 
the policy would be issued, if issued at all. It would introduce 
great uncertainty in all business transactions, if a party mak-
ing· written proposals for a contract, with representations 
to induce its execution, should be allowed to show, after it 
had been obtained, that he did not know the contents of his 
proposals, and to enforc.e it, notwithstanding their falsity 
as to matters essential to its obligation and validitv. · Con-
tracts could not be made, or bu~1ness fairly condirnted, if 
such a rule should prevail; and there is no reason why 
13* it should *be applied merely to contracts of insurance. 
There is nothing in their nature which distinguishei=; 
them in this particular from others. But here the right is 
asserted to prove not only that the assured did not make 
the statements contained in his answers, but that he nev:)1· 
read the application, and to recover upon a contract obtained 
by representations admitted to be false, just as though they 
were true. If he had read even the printed lines of his ap. 
plication he would have seen that it stipulated that the rig·hts 
of the company could in no respect be affected by his verb:d 
statements, or by those of its agents, unless the same wer, 
reduced to writing and forwarded with his application to tlv 
home office. The Company, like any other principal, couh1 
limit the authority of its agents, and thus bind all partie~ 
dealing with them with knowledge of the limitation. It mrst 
he presumed that he read the application and was cognizant 
of the limitations therein expressed.' '' 
Also the following extract from the opinion in Ryan v. 
1V orld Mit,t-ual Life Ins. Co., 41 Conn. 168, 19 Am. Rep. MJO. 
is quoted with approval in both Royal fo . ::urance Company 
,·. Poole, 148 Va. 363 (at pag·e 272), aud Providmzt Relief As .. ~. 
,·. Butts, 1.58 Va. 259 (at page 266): 
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''But it cannot be supposed that these defendants intended 
to clothe this a~;ent with authority to perpetrate a fraud upon 
themselves. That he deliberately intended to defraud 
13-a* them is manifest. He well knew *that if correct an-
swers were given no policy would issue. Prompted by 
some motive he sought to obtain a policy by means of false 
answers. His duty required him not. only to write the an-
swers truly as given by the applicant, but also to communicat~ 
to his principal any other fact material to the risk which 
might come to bis knowledge from any other source. His con-
duct in this case was a gross violation of duty, in fraud of 
his principal, and in the interest of the other party. ; To hold 
the principal responsible for his acts, and assist in the con-
summation of the fraud, would be monstrous injustice. When 
an agent is apparently acting for his principal, but is really 
acting for himself or third persons, and against his principal, 
there is no agency in respect to that transaction, at least as 
between the agent himself, or the person for whom . he is 
really acting, and the principal * • ·l(c. The fraud could not 
be perpetrated bv the agent alone. The aid of the plaintiff 
or the insured, either as an accomplice or as an instrument. 
was essential. If she was. an accomplice, then she partici-
pated in the fraud, and the case falls within 'the principle of 
.Lewis v. The Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 39 Conn. 100. 
If she was an instrument she was so because of her own neg-
ligence, and that is equally a bar to her right to rec.over. 
'She says that she and her husband signed the app1icatiou 
without reading it and without its being read to them. That 
of itself was inexcusable negligence. The application 
14* contained her agreements and i(crepresentations in au 
important contract. When she signed it she was bound 
to know what she signed. The law requires that the insured 
shall not only, in good faith, answer all the interrogatories 
correctly, but shall use rensona.ble diligence to see that the 
answers are correctlv written. It is for his interest to do 
so, and the insurer h·as the right to presume that he will do 
it. He has it in his power to prevent this species of fraud 
and the insurer l1as not.'' 
The distinguishing· featurer.; of this line of cases are well 
Rtated in Royal Insurance Company v. Poole, 148 Va. 363, 
at page 374: 
"It will thus be seen that the disting"Uishing features of 
the class of cases we are dealing with are that the authority 
of the agent is limited, that the insured has notice of this 
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limitation of power ( and signing an application for insur-
ance containing the limitation is regarded as such notice 
wliether .~pplicant reads the notice or not}, and the insurer 
has no notice of the falsity of the answers.', 
IV. 
Mr. Parker Had Notir:e of the Limitation of the A,qentT.<; 
Powers. 
The evidence is clear tliat the agent did not have power to 
bind the risk. The question then remains: *Did Mr. 
15* Parker lta.ve notice of such limita.tion of power? The 
evidence is clear that after the sales talk Mr. Parker 
was told tl1at he would have to sign an application. The 
application was banded to him and he signed it. By reading 
the application it is seen that I1e was called upon to sign, and 
did sign, an agreement that "no obligation shall exist against 
said company-unless said company shall issue a polfoy-
and the same is delivered to me."' Could anything be clearer! 
Mr. Parker was not only put on notice that the agent had no 
authority to bind the risk; but he actually agreed in writing· 
that no obligation was to exist until the policy was issued 
and delivered. 
In 2 Couch on Insnrance1 p. 1483, we find: 
''Knowledge of the extent of the agent's authority may 
arise from an express or implied notice of restriction upon 
the agent's authority, or it may exist where the circumstances 
are such as to put such parties upon inquiry; * * * In fact 
the insured is bound by any notice of limitations upon the 
agent's authority which a prudent man is bound to regard1 
since a notice is the equivalent of knowledge.'' ( Citing 
many cases.) 
The case Cauman v. American Credit Indem'liity Co. of 
New York, 229 Mass. 278, 118 N. E. 259, an Agent, Mapes, 
with authority to make contracts and issue insurance policies, 
sought to change the terms of a written application by con-
temporaneous oral statements and the court in holding that 
such change could not bind the insurance company said 
rn· at page ... 261 : 
'' Mapes was a g;eneral agent of the defendant, and if it be 
assumed that he had a.utl1ority to make contracts and issue 
insurance policies and vary the terms of such policies and 
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bind the defendant, although contrary to the express terms 
of his contract of employment, still as an agent with the most 
extensive authority, he could not by contemporaneous oral 
representations override the express agreement made bv the 
plaintiffs and contained in the written applications signed by 
Wolper. Allen v. Mass. Mut . .A.cc. Assn., 167 Mass. 18, 44 
N. E. 1053." 
And again at page 261 : 
'' If Wolper did not see fit to read the applications or the 
conditions of the policies to which the applications expressly 
ref erred, the rights of the parties are not to be affected there-
by, as there is nothing to show that he was prevented from 
informing himself of their contents if he so desired.'' 
In the case of Win-nesheek Ins. Oo. v. H olzgrafe, 53 in 
516, agents of the insurance company solicited the applicam 
for fire insurance and stated that the policy would take ef-
fect on the day of the application, and ari application was 
signed which contained the clause tha't the policy would bear 
the date and take effect at noon of the day the appl~cat~on 
was approved. The property was destroyed by. fire. be-
17* fore •the application was approved, and the court in 
denying liability on the policy said at page 523: 
"As by the written agreement -of complainant with the in-
surance company, no contract of insurance was to take ef-
fect until the day the application was approved, and, as it 
was not approved, it follows there was no contract of insur-
ance; that the company had incurred no legal li~bility to 
make good this loss, and no recovery could be had against 
them. 
"But it is urged by appellee, that these verbal representa-
tions of the agents should be considered as the representa-
tions of their principal, and they establish a contract of in-
surance definite in its terms, and in full force, when the 
building was consull}ed. 
· "It has been often said by this court, that a contract can-
not exist partly in writing· and partly in parol. Lmie v. Sha.1·v, 
3 Scam. 573; 0 'Reer v. 8trong, 13 Ill. 689; Marshall v. Gridley, 
46 ib. 250.'' 
In the case of Ghaniberlain v. Prudential Ins. Oo. of 
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America, 109 vVis. 4, 85 N. W. 128, the plaintiff's husband, 
without reading it, signed an application for a life insur-
ance policy, stipulating that no obligation existed on ac-
count thereof, though the premiums were paid, unless a policy 
was issued. He paid the first week's premium and received 
a receipt therefor. No policy was ever issucci. He died and 
suit was hrought. The agent of the insurance companv rep-
resented that the insurance commenced from the payment of 
the first weekly premium. The Court in holdin o· that 
18* the written *application governed and could n~t he 
varied by prior or contemporaneous parol evidence said 
at page 129: 
"While this was in form an action to establish and en-
force an oral contract of life insurance, it was in fact au 
attemp~ to alter the terms of a written contract by parol evi-
dence. That the application of Chamberlain, and the re-
ceipt given by the agent of the defendant, constituted a writ-
ten contract which was certain in its terms, cannot be doubted. 
This contract, in substance, was that, if the company accepted 
the application and issued a policy thereon, Chamberlain 
was to be insured in the sum of $500. thereby, and the 35 cents 
would constitute the first week's premium; but, if the ap-
plication was not accepted, then the company incurrerl no 
obligation. There was no fraud daimed or proven. The 
most that was claimed was that Chamberlain did not read 
either the application or the receipt, and that the agent said 
that the insurance would go into effect at once. But parties 
cannot thus escape the effect of written contracts. Chambei·-
lain could read, and he was clearly guilty of negligence in 
not ascertaining what agreements the written papers coli· 
tained, and neither he nor those claiming under him ca 11 
escape the effects of that negligence. The written contmct. 
is binding and must control. If, under the circumstance .... 
disclosed here, written contracts could be set aside, thc~y 
would be of little value.'' 
In the case of Basi-nsky v. National Casualty Co., 122 
Wash. 1, 209 Pac. 1077, the applicant signed an ""appli-
19"'' cation reading "I agree that this application shall nol 
he binding upon the company until accepted either b · 
the secretary at the home office or by an agent duly authorizeLl 
to issue policies." The agent told the applicant that be wa:-. 
protected from the time that he receipted for the money and 
tltat the insurance went into effect at that time. A receipt 
was given and before the policy was accepted the applicant 
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was injured .and suit was brought. The Court in denying the 
right of recovery said at page 1079: 
"Since the insurance papers show tlmt there was. no insur-
ance in effect at the time of respondent's injury, he cannot 
recover, unless the statement of the agent, made at the time 
the application was given, that the respondent was protected 
from that time, should alter the situation .. Let us see whether 
the insurance agent had authority to make such an agree-
ment, and whether the appellant was bound thereby. · The ap;. 
plication for the insurance informed the respondent that the 
agent, Handy, had no power or authority to accept the appli-
cation or to make any contract as to when the insurance would 
go into effect, because it, in effect, stated that there would be 
no contract of insurance_ .1-1:ntil the application had been ac-
cepted by some perso.n in authority other than the agent 
Handy. If Mr. Handy had authority t.o agree that the in-
surance would start at the date of the application, he like-
wise must have bad authority to accept the application, a 
power which the application itself directly denies.. Re-
20* spondent had no right tp rely on any such *statement 
from the agent, because the application, by necessary 
inference, showed he did not have such power. It seems to 
us plain that it was the intention of the parties that there 
could be no insurance until some person authorized so to 
do accepted the application .. The application is hut a. propo-
sition or a promise by the applicant, and cannot in itself put 
the insurance in force until some person with authority t6 
hind the appellant had completed the contract by accepting 
the proposition. In the case of Rogers v. Eqi1,,itable Mut'ltaf 
Life <f Endowment .A~sociation, 103 Iowa, 337, 72 N. W. 538, 
the facts were very similar to those here. The Court said: 
'' 'In short, there is no case·coming to our notice that holds 
to the rule of appellant's eontention. In fact, we do not 
find a case where the question is considered as toi a company 
being liable on a policy where an acceptance of the- applica-
fion was necessary to complete the contract, and the appli-
cation had not been received when the loss or accident oc-
curred, that an acceptance afterwards is held to relate back 
to the date of the application. Such a rule would be viola-
tive of all general rules governing the taking effect of con-
tracts. • • ~ In 2 May, Insurance, section 400, it is said that 
the policy, if delivered, takes effect from its date, unless it 
be otherwise stated. That seems to be the uniform rule where 
not otherwise provided.' '' 
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In the case at bar the application is even more favorable 
to the defendant company for its says that "no •obli-
21 * gatiorr shall_ exist against said company on account of' 
this. appl_ication although I may have paid premium::; 
thereon, µnless said company shall issue a policy in pursu-
ance thereof and the same is delivered to me.'' It will be 
noted that· ·in the case at bar the company must issue th~ 
policy and deliver it, while in the case above quoted the ap-
plication must be accepted either by tl1e secretary at the 
home office or by an agent duly authorized to issue policies _ 
v .. 
Faili1tre to Read the Application Is No E$citse. 
The plaintiff says however that there is no proof that Mr. 
Parker read the application.. The evidence is clear however 
that he signed it. The same claim was ma.de in the above 
cited cases; and the courts held that it was inexcusable neg-
ligence for an intended insured to sign an application with-
out reading· it; that he who signs an application is presumed 
in law to know what the application contained; and that an 
intended insured, after signing an application, will not be 
heard to say that he did not read what he signed. 
Royal Ins. Co. v! Poole, 148 Va. 363. 
Provident Relief Assn. v. Butts, 158 Va. 259. 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U.S. 519. 
Ryan v. World Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 Conn. 168, 19 Am. 
Rep. 490. 
22• •in Royal Ins-urance Co. v. Poole, 148 Va. 363, at page 
373, the court quotes with approval from Ryan v. W orlrl 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 Conn. 168, 19 Am. Rep. 490: 
'' She says that she and her husband signed the application 
without reading it and without its being read to them. That 
of itself was inexcusable negligence. The application con-
tained her agreements and representations in an important 
contract. When she signed it she was bound to know what 
she signed. The law requires that the insured shall not only, 
in good faith, answer all the interrogatories correctly, but 
shall use reasonable diligence to see that the answers a re 
correctly written. It is for his interest to clo so, and tbe 
insurer has the right to presume that he will do it. He has 
it in bis power to prevent this species of fraud and the in-
surer has not. '' 
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Again in the Poole case, (supra), the eourt quotes with 
approval from Judge Riely in Georgia Home Ins. Oo. v. 
Goode, 95 Va. 751, 30 S. E. 366, ref erring to the Fletcher case, 
(supra): 
"It was his duty to read the application which he signed, 
and he was chargeable with notice of what it contained." 
23 .. 
There Was No .Acceptance of the Application, and Hence No 
Contract o.f Insurance. 
To constitute a contract of insurance there must be not 
only an offer (application), hut also an acceptance of that 
offer, by the insurance company, for until the application has 
been accepted there is no meeting of the minds of the con-
tracting parties. 
1 Couch on Insurance, Section 85. 
Haskin v. Agricitltural F. Ins. Co., 78 Va. 700. 
Haden v. Farmers, etc., 80 Va. 683. 
There is no obligation upon an insurance company to ac-
cept every application or assign a reason for its refusal. 
1 Couch on Insurance, p. 148 : 
'' .And as no obligation rests upon the insurance company to 
accept, (Application) it has an absolute right to insist that 
it must accept before it shall be bound a.s an insurer, even 
though a part or all of the premium is paid at the time the 
application is made. And as an insurance company has a 
right to insist that it must accept before it shall be bound. 
so it may reject a proposal at its option at any time priol' 
to acceptance, and this even though the premium may have 
been paid, in whole or in part, at the time the application wai;; 
made.'' 
24* *6 R. C. L. 603: 
'' As no contract is complete without mutual assent of th(l 
parties, an offer imposes no obligation until it is acceptecl 
according to its terms. So long· as the offer has ·been neither 
accepted or rejected the negotiation remains open and im-
poses no obligation upon either party.'' 
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As there must be a meeting of the minds between the c.on-
tracting parties, the applicant must be. alive when the ap-
plication is accepted, for the simple reason that there can 
be no meeting between a dead and a live person. 
In 12 Amer. Juris. 542, we find : 
"In order that there be a meeting- of the minds of the par-
ties, the party making the offer must be alive when the letter 
of acceptance is mailed.'' c. f. 111 oorej v. P.ierson, 6 Iowa 269; 
71 Am. Dec. 409. 
In the case of Beaman v. JJtfotual Life Insurance C'omva;ny, 
73 Fed. (2nd) 391, an application was signed on December 
13th, 1931, the applicant was accidentally killed on December 
21st, 1931, the application was received at the home officP 
on December 23rd, -1931, and the application was approved. 
The Court in holding that there was no contract of insuranc~ 
ever made said at page 397 : 
"In Paine v. Pacifia Mutual Life Ins. Co., sitpra, in which 
Judge Walter H. Sanborn wrote the opinion, the appli-
25* cant *died the day before the application reached the 
insurance company's home office where it was examine:1 
and approved in ignorance of the applicant's death. In tlw 
eourse of the opinion in that case it is said: 
" 'The death of Kendall on June 3, 1890, before the app.i-
cation had reached defendant's home office, revoked his offer 
to beeome insured by the defendant company, which was con-
tained in this application, and rendered the making· of tlw 
proposed contract of insurance impossible. An offer is re-
voked by the death of the proposer, or by the death of tlw 
party to whom the offer is made before acceptance. * * * 
'' 'Conceding that the defendant could and did determine to 
accept the application on June 7, 1890, one day after its re-
ceipt and four days after the death of Kendall, still such a<•-
ceptance and the contract, if so made, were void because the 
1ife that was the subject-matter of the contract was not then 
· n existence. The first party to this proposed contract wn ~ 
Kendall; the second, the defendant; the subject-matter of the 
contract, Kendall's life. The contract was not made, in an~· 
event, before June 7th, when defendant's medical director 
approved the application, and at tl1at time the first party 
to it was dead, and its subject-ma.tfaw did not exist. Neithe1· 
party would have knowingly made an insurance contract rc-
g·arding a life that was not in being. Parties make no con-
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tract where the thing which they sup,posed to exist, and the 
existence of which was indispensable to the making of their 
e·ontract, had no existence. 
" 'The application for insurance in the instant case, 
26* being subject to approval by the *insurance company, 
was in effect an offer which was revoked by the death 
of the applicant, and his death destroyed the subject-matter 
of the offer.' " 
And so in the case at bar the application was signed Janu-
ary 7th. · It could not have been received at the home office 
until January 13th, the. day before the applicant was killed. 
The application was never accepted, ·but was rejected. There 
was never a meeting of the minds between the applicant and 
the insurance company· and hence there is no contract of in-
surance. · 
CONCLUSION. 
It is submitted that no contract of in~urance ever came 
into existence, and hence there is no liability upon the de-
fendant company. The language of the application is clear, 
and by it the intended insured ag-reed that there was to be 
no liability upon the company until a policy was issued and 
delivered. To allow recovery in this case would permit prior 
or contemporaneous oral statements. to change the language 
of the written application. To permit recovei.~y in this case 
based upon oral representations, where there was a written 
application, would approve fraud on the part of the agent, 
participated in by the intended insured. To permit a rec.ov-
ery in this case would be to approve a contract which never 
ha4. been in existence a.s there had been no meeting of 
27• the minds of the *contracting parties. The applicant 
when he signed the application knew and expressly 
agreed that there was to be no coverage until a policy was 
actually issued and delivered. The evidence is clear that 
the applic.ation was rejected, and that no policy was ever 
issued. 
Therefore it is respectfully submitted that the verdict of 
the jury and judgment of the lower court should be set aside, 
and that final judgment should be rendered for the defendant, 
your petitioner. 
PRAYER. 
For the reasons above set forth, the Court of Law and 
Chancery of The City of Norfolk, as your petitioner is ad-
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vised and now charges, clearly erred to the prejudice of your 
petitioner· fo its rulings and judgment aforesaid. Where-
fore your petitioner prays this Honorable Court to grant it 
a writ of errfif and s·u,persedeas to the judgment aforesaid,. 
and review and reverse said judgment, and render final judg-
ment in favor of your petitioner. 
Copy of this petition was delivered to Messrs. Kellam 
and Kellam, Board of Trade Building, Norfolk, Virginia, op-
posing counsel in the trial court on the 5th day of November, 
1941. P~titioner adopts this petition as its opening brief,. 
and desires to state orally the reasons for reviewing the de-
cision complained of. This petition is being· presented to 
Mr. Justice Eggleston. 
28* ,,. Attention is invited to the faet that the petitioner 
has given a bond in the penalty of $1,200.00 conditioned 
as required for a supersedeas (M. R., p. 6). 
PE.OPLE.S LIFE INSURANCE COM-
P ANY, Petitioner. 
By: JOHN S. RIXE.Y, 
RIXEY AND RIXEY, 
Attorneys for the Petitioner, 
Citizens Bank Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Of Counsel. 
I, John S. Rixey, attorney at law, practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my 
opinion it is proper that the judgment and decisions com-
plained ·Of in the foregoing· petition should be reviewed by 
said e.ourt. 
Received Nov. 5, 1941. 
JOHN S. RIXEY, 
Citizens Bank Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
J. W. E. 
November 19, 1941. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded 
hy the court. No additional boncl required. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Court of Law and Chancery of the City 
of Norfolk, on Monday, the 21st day of July, 1941. 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: On the 5th 
day ·of May, 1941, came Grace Parker, plaintiff, by her at-
torneys and filed in the Clerk's Office of said Court her no-
tice of motion for judgment against Peoples Life Insurance 
Company of Washington, D. C., Incorporated under the laws 
of the United States in the District of Columbia, defendant, 
in the words and figures following: 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
TO PEOPLES LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY 
OF vV ASHINGTON, D. C. 
Please take notice that on the 19th day of May, 1941, be-
tween the hours of ten (10) A. M. and two (2) P. M. o'clock 
of that day, or as ·soon thereafter as eonnsel may be heard, 
the undersigned will move the Court of Law and Chancery 
of the City -0f Norfolk, at the Courthouse in said City, for a 
judgment and award of execution thereon against you for the 
sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars, with interest 
thereon from the 14th day of .January, 1941, and the cost of 
this proceeding·, which sum iA due by you to the undersigned 
by reason of the following· facts, to-wit: 
That on, to-wit, the 7th day of January, 1941, in the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, you, Peoples Life Insurance 
page 2 ~ Company of Washington, D. 0., a corporation in-
corporated under the laws of the United States in 
the District -0f Columbia, and authorized to do business in thiR 
State, by and through your agent, servant and employee, with 
due authority and power, and acting in the scope of his 
said authority, powers and duties, in consideration of two 
dollars seventeen ($2.l 7) cents t11en and there paid you by 
Gordon Parker, as premium in advance for four weeks and 
in consideration of weekly payments of premiums of fifty 
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four (.54) cents to be paid you by said Gordon Parker after 
the lapse of said four weeks, did insure the said Gordon 
Parker on and from the 7th day of January, 1941, against 
loss of his life in the sum of Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars 
from natural causes, and in a sum of One Thousand 
($1,000.00) Dollars for loss of his life by accidental means, 
to be paid to the undersigned, the then wife and now widow 
of said Gordon Parker, as beneficiary, which said contract of 
insurance was to be in full force and eff eet on and from said 
7th day of January, 1941, and to be further evidenc.ed by a 
written policy of insurance, incorporating· such terms, to be 
delivered by you to said Gordon Parker, within a reasonable 
time th~reafter. That on the 14th day of January, 1941, while 
the said contract of insurance was in force, hut before the 
delivery of such written policy by you to said_Gordon Parker, 
the said Gordon Parker was accidently killed, and the sum of 
One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars thereby immediately be-
came due and payable to the undersigned by you; that you 
were duly advised of such death and a demand made on you 
for the payment of the said sum, which you declined 
page 3 ~ to pay and denied all liability on .said contract of 
insurance; that the said Gordon Parker in his life-
time, and the undersigned since his death, performed all of 
the conditions of s~id insurance contract, except so far a..; 
waived by you, yet you have failed and still refuse to pay 
the af oresaicl .sum to the undersigned. 
HENCE this motion for judgment. 
Respectfully, 
GRACE PARKER 
By F. E. KELLAM and 
RICHARD B. K}JLLAM: 
Counse1. 
RETURN. 
Executed in the City of Richmond, Va. May 2, 1941, bY 
<1elivering in duplicate a copy of within Not.ice of Mofion f 01· 
· .Tudgment, the Sooretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
:md as such Sooretary of the Commonwealth the Statutorr 
Agent for Peoples Life Insurance Company· of "'\Vashington, 
D.C. 
Plaee of residence and place of hmdnesR of said R. -L. 
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.Jackson being in the City of Richmond, Va. Tf'ee of $2.50 paid 
the Secretary at time of service. 
Sergeant's Fee $1.00 
JOHN G. SAUNDERS 
Sergeant of Richmond, Va. 
By P. H. BOWIS, 
Deputy Sergeant. 
And afterwards: I~ the Court of Law and Chancery of 
the City of Norfolk, on the 19th day of May, 1.941. 
page 4 } . This day came the parties, by their attorneys, 
and thereupon the defendant pleaded the general 
issue to which the plaintiff replied generally. 
And afterwards : In said Court, on the 24th day of .June, 
1941. 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and the 
defendant :filed herein its plea of tender, and then came a 
jury, to-wit: J. C. Fitchett, W. C. Hassell, S. A. Meads, Geo. 
M. Shaw, J. M:. Reynolds, W. E. Cathey, and Charles L. 
·wharton, who being sworn the truth to speak upon the issue 
joined, and having heard the evidence, returned a verdict in 
these words: ''We the jury find for the plaintiff in the sum 
of $1,000.00. '' 
Wher~upon the defendant moved the court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and enter final judgment for the de-
fendant on the ground that the said verdict of the jury is con-
trary to the law and the evidence, and without evidence to 
support it, the further hearing of which motion, is continued. 
The following is the Plea of Tender :filed herein: 
PLEA OF TENDER. 
The said defendant by its attorneys comes and says that 
the plaintiff ought not to have or maintain this action against 
it to recover any sum by reason of non-payment of 
page 5 ~ any sum in this action mentioned because it says 
that the defendant, prior to the institution of this 
suit, tendered to the plaintiff the sum of $2.17, paid to the 
Peoples Life Insurance Company of Washington, D. C. and 
that the plaintiff wholly refused to accept the same; and the 
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said defendant says that from thence hitherto it has been ancl 
still is ready to pay to the said plaintiff the sum of $2.17:, 
which is the a.mount paid by the said plaintiff to the said 
defendant upon application of the policy sued for, and the 
said defendant now brings the same into Court ready to be 
paid to the said plaintiff if she will accept the same and thi8-
the said defendant is ready to verify. 
Therefore, it prays judgment if the said plaintiff ought 
to have or maintain her action aforesaid. 
RIXEY & RIXEY 
p. d. 
And now, In said ,Court, on the 21st day of July, 1941. 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and the de-
fendant's motion to set aside the verdict of the jury rendered 
herein on the 24th day of J"une, 1941, being fully heard by 
the court, is overruled. 
Therefore it is considered by the court t11at the plaintiff 
recover of' the defendant the sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) 
Dollars, with interest thereon from June 24, 1941, until paid,. 
and he:r eosts by her in this behalf expended. 
page 6 ~ To which ruling and judgment of the Court the 
defendant duly excepted. 
At the instance of the defendant who desires to present to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals a petition for ~ writ of error 
and supersedeas to this judgment, it is ordered that when the 
defendant, or some one for it, shall give bond, with surety, 
before the Clerk of this Court, in the penalty of $1,200.00. 
conditioned according to law, execution of this judgment 
shall be suspended froni that date for a period of sixty days 
from the expiration of this term of court, and thereafte1· 
until such petition is acted on by the Supr~me .Court of Ap-
peals if such petition is actually filed within the specified 
time. 
And afterwards: In the Clerk's Office of the Court of 
Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, on the 22nd day 
of August, 1941. 
I, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, do hereby certify that the de-
fendant has given a bond conditioned as required for a 
s'l1,persedeas in section sixty-three hundred and fifty-one of 
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the Code of Virginia, in the penalty _of Twelve Hundred Dol-
lars. 
W. L. PRIEUR, .JR., Clerk. 
page 7 ~ The following is the stenographic report of the 
testimony and other incidents of said trial au-
thenticated and verified by the Judge of said Court, made a 
part of the record herein and lodged with the Clerk: 
page 8 ~ Virginia: 
In the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk. 
Grace Parker, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Peoples Life Insurance Company of Washington, D. C., In-
corporated under the laws of the United States in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Defendant. 
To Floyd E. Kellam and Richard B. Kellam, Attorneys for 
Grace Parker : 
PLE·ASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 20th day of August, 
1941, at 10 o'clock, A. l\L, or as soon thereafter as it may 
be heard, in the courtroom of said court, in the City of Nor-
folk, Virginia, the undersigned will present to the Honorable 
0. L. Shackleford, who presided over the trial of the above 
styled case in said court on June 24, 1941, the stenographic 
report of the testimony and other incidents of said trial, to 
he authenticated and verified bv him. 
And immediately thereafter,"' on the same day, the under-
signed will apply to the Clerk of said Court for a transcript 
of the record in said case, for the purpose of presenting the 
same with a petition to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia for a writ of error and s-itpe·rsedeas therein. 
PEOPLES LLFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF WASHINGTON, D. C. 
By RIXEY & RIXEY, 
Its Attorneys. 
Legal service of the fore going notice is hereby accepted, 
this 18 da.y of August, 1941. 
F. E. KELLAM AND RICHARD B. KELLAM, 
Attorneys for Mrs. Grace Parker. 
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page 9 ~ Virginia, 
In the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk. 
Grace Parker, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Peoples Life Insurance Company of "\Vashington, D. C., In-
corporated under the laws of the United States in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, _pefendant. 
TESTIMONY. 
Stenographic report of the testimony and other incidents 
of the trial of the above entitled case, tried in the Court of 
Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, on June 
24, 1941, before Honorable 0. L. Shackleford, Judge of said 
court, and a jury, including the motions and objections of 
the parties, the instructions to the jury, the action of the 
Court thereon, and the exceptions of the parties. 
Present: Messrs. Floyd E. and Richard B. Kellam, Attor-
neys for the plaintiff. 
Messrs. Rixey & Rixey, Attorneys for the defendant. 
page 10 ~ GRACE PARKER, 
the plaintiff, having been duly sworn, testified a::: 
follows: 
Examined by Mr. Kellam: 
Q. You are Mrs. Grace Parker? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Parker? 
A. 163 A View Avenue, at Ocean View. 
Q. How long have yon been living there, Mrs. Parked 
A. I came there the 7th of September, 1940. 
Q. Where did you formerly reside Y 
A. In Durham, North Carolina. 
Q. Where was your husband employed? 
A. Here in Norfolk? 
Q. Yes. 
A. He was employed for the ,vnson Brothers over at the 
Navy Base. He was em.ployed with the Vil'ginin Engineer-
ing Company until Christmas and then went witl1 the 'Wilson 
Brothers. 
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Q. Mr. Gordon Parker was your husband! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when did he die! 
A. He died on January the 14th. 
Q. 19417 
A. Ye~ sir. 
Q. What was the cause of his death 7 wa·s it accidental 
or from natural cause 7 
page 11 } A. Well, they said a scaffold broke with him and 
he fell. 
Mr. Rixey: Don't testify to something you. don't know, 
Mrs. Parker. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. He was accidentally killed, was he 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mrs. Parker, did an agent of the Peoples Life Insur-
ance Company call at your home Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What da.y was that, do you remember, what day of the 
month? 
A. No. 
Q. How long before Mr. Parker's death f 
A. That he was there? Well, Gordon was killed January 
14th, and he was there a week before Gordon was killerl. 
Q. A week before Mr. Parker was killeclY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was that agent f 
A. Mr. Sowell. 
Q. What company did he represent? 
A. The Peoples Life Insurance. 
Q. What time of day was it when he c.alleg at your home? 
A. Well, I don't remember that. We had all at dinner 
and all of us were sitting· in the dining room-I mean in the 
living room. 
}Jage 12 } Q. Sometime in the evening, wasn't it, 
A. Yes; sometime after six, I guess. 
Q. Now tell the Court and jury what this gentleman said 
when he came to the door and what took place there. 
A. Well, somebody knocked on the door and I went to the 
door, and he introduced hisself and told me he was repre-
senting the Peoples Life Insurance and wanted to know if 
l1e couldn't sell-do some business around there; that was 
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the words he said; and I told him there was enough of them 
there for· him to do some business. So I hopped on Gordon 
first-that was my husband--because before we left Durham 
four or five- montl1s ago we had insurance with the Pilot 
Life Company on him and his work g·ot so scarce there and 
times got so hard he had to drop his, but I kept all the rest. 
So I hopped on him. I said ''Well, you need some.'' S:> 
then the man began to talk to Gordon, my husband, and he 
was trying to sell him a thousand dollar policy and he told 
him no, that he couldn't keep up that much; he would take 
out five hundred; and he tolcl him what the premiums woukJ 
be and just asked him bis age and about his diseases and 
all that. 
Q. ,v en, now, l\frs. Parker, do you remember what he told 
him the premium would be? 
A. He said if you paid it iby the week it was 54 or 55 cents, 
somewhere along there, but anyway for four weeks 
page 13 ~ it would be $2.17, and he told him he would rathe1· 
pay it tha.t way, pay it by the month; that it would 
he better to pay it that way. 
Q. Now after Mr. Parker told him that he was going to 
take five hundred dollars worth of insurance, you say the 
agent asked him some questions! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did Mr. Parker sign an application 7 
A. Yes; and there was three or four of my ·boarders sit-
ting in there on the settee and they was all fixing to go out 
to the show, and he asked one of the rest while Gordon wa~ 
signing it-then he turned and was on the rest of them about 
taking out some insurance, and they told him that they was 
all going· to the show, for him to oome back another time. 
Q. Now did the agent read the application to Mr. Parker? 
A.. No, sir, he didn't; he will tel1 you he didn't. 
Q. Did he tell Mr. Parker to read the application T 
A. No, he didn't. He .says '' I won't take up but just a 
minute of your time." He says ''Sign it'', and Gordon 
signed it, and I went and got the money and give him; and 
he told me three different times-he says "You never know 
when a crowd of men goes off at nig·ht when they are going· 
to come back to you", and he says ''Your insur-
page 14 } ance is in full benefit right from this minute,'' 
because everyone in that house certainlv heard 
him when l1e said it, because he tried to get one of them other 
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fellows to take out insurance and told them-he says ''You 
will Le in full benefit if I write you up. tonight." 
Q. Did he give you a. receipt for the money you paid him Y 
A. Yes, sir, he give me a receipt. 
Q. What did you do with that receipt. 
A. I stuck it just like I do everything under different 
bureau scarves and different things, and when I went home 
to bury Gordon and come back I had a. time trying to find 
it, but I did find it. Then they come after it and I wouldn't 
give it to them. 
Q. This same agent that sold you, did he come down to 
see you about iU 
A. Yes, sir, he did; ,and he was mighty nice too. 
Q. What statement did he make! 
A. He looked at me-he wa.s kind of bold-he looked at 
me and he said "Mrs. Parker, we have got to have that insur-
ance before we can see about paying you off,'' and I says 
"Well, that's all I have got to show that I was in the insur-
ance business,'' and I never give it to him. 
Q. You .said that you said to him that was all you had to 
show-
page 15 ~ Mr. Rixey: Let her testify. 
A. He said he had to have that receipt to show the com-
pany, you know, so they could pay me off. 
Q. After Mr. Sowell came, did any other representative of 
the Peoples Life Insurance Company come to see you 7 
A. No. 
Q. Did Mr. Saunders come to see you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Isn't he a representative of the Peoples Life Insurance 
Company? 
A. He talked and went on, but you know it was right after 
Gordon was buried a.nd I was so upset I just didn't know 
what he said. 
Q. See if you under~tand what I am asking you. After 
Mr. Sowell came to see you and asked for the receipt and you 
refused to give it to him, did anybody else from the Peoples 
Life Insurance Company come to see you about this Y 
A. No, sir; only the manager. 
Q. That is Mr. Saunders? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Isn't he from the Peoples? 
• 
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.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did he want Y 
A. He said did I get a receipt. He said he would give me 
my $2.17 back if I would give him the receipt, and 
page 16 } I told him no, that after I seen whether they could 
be made to stick up to their word, then I would 
give it back to ~im. 
· Q. Mrs. Parker, you have boug·ht industrial insurance be-
fore, have you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Payable by weekly premium Y 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state whether or not Mr. Parker was asked 
that night whether or not he had ever been refused for any 
insurance or not Y . 
A. I certainly will state he did not ask him that. 
Q. The agent did not ask him that? 
A. No, sir; he will tell you he didn't. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Parker, don't answer this until counsel has 
a ·chance to state an objection. You stated that you had bought 
industrial insurance before Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you tell the Court and jury whether or not it i.:; 
customary among-don't answer this until-among indu ·.:.-
trial insurance agents to represent that if premiums are im-
mediately paid the insurance takes immediate effect? 
Mr. Rixey: I object, your Honor. I object to the que~-
tion on the ground that he is asking her for a custom among 
agents ·of industrial insurance companies without specif :-
ing any-she knows nothing- about it except a few 
page 17 } little matters ·she has had herself. I don't think 
. it is any evidence of custom of insurance com-
panies. 
Mr. Kellam: I will qualify her a little further, leavin'.:!,' 
that question. 
Bv Mr. Kellam: 
·Q. Have you on numerous occasions heard industrial b1-
surance agents have conversations with prospec.tive pur-
(•hasers, agents talking to prospective purchasers? 
Mr. Rixey: Your Honor, I object to what she has heard 
fl.g'Cnts of various companies say when talking to prospective 
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customers. I don't think that is material here. We are in· 
terested here in a contract. 
Mr. Kellam: Your Honor, it has this to do with it: The 
defendant's position in this case is that the agent could not 
make such representations. If it had become a custom and 
usage among industrial insurance companies for ,their agents 
to represent that policies do take immediate effect and that 
ils customary among· all indm;trial agents, ,the law presumes 
that the companies are advised their agents are doing that; 
and for that reason it is admis.sible to show here whether or 
not the company was advised of their agents making such 
representations and, if so, they would be bound by it. 
(There was further argument by counsel with reference 
to the objection.) 
page 18 ~ The Court: All right; I will admit the evidence. 
Mr. Rixey: Note an exception, Your Honor. 
Q. (Read by re_porter) Have you on numerous occasions 
heard industrial insurance agents have conversations with 
prospective purchasers, agents talking· to prospective pur-
chasers! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mrs. Parker, state for the Court and jury whether that 
is the usual custom among insurance agents. 
A. Yes, sir; that is what they all tell you. 
Q. Have you on numerous occasions -bought insurance from 
these industrial insurance companies? 
A.. Y e·s, sir; and I would always pay in advance and they 
would give me a receipt and I always thought they were good. 
Nothing ever happened, you see, and I still thought that 
all insurance was alike and I thoug·ht they would all be 
good. 
Q. Have you heard it discussed on numerous occasions by 
persons with reference to this custom? 
Mr. Rixey: I object to that. 
The Court: That is hearsay. I will sustain it. 
I3y Mr. Kellam: 
Q. How many children have you? 
A. I have got seven. 
Q. You carry insurance on all of them! 
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.A.. .A.II of them, the married ones and all. 
page 19 ~ Q. What type of insurance do you carry, that 
industrial insurance f 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. By that yon mean payable weekly f 
A. Some of it is weekly and some I pay by the month. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. How many insurance agents have yon talked with since 
you moved to Norfolk? 
.A.. I haven't talked with any only-
Q. You haven't talked with any since you moved to Nor-
folk except Mr. Sowell Y 
A. And the Pilot. 
Q. The agent for the Pilot and Mr. Sowell, they are the 
only ones you have talked to since you moved to Norfolk! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So when you were talking a moment ago about the dif-
ferent agents you talked with, you had reference to tbe ones 
you talked with in North Carolina; that is correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now you talked with the man from the Pilot Life and 
they refused to re-write the polic.y, didn't they Y 
A. No; if they did, I don't know anything about it. I al-
ways kept insurance on Gordon in the Pilot until it got to the 
place I couldn't keep it up. 
page 20 ~ Q. Then didn't you try to renew the policy in 
Norfolk? 
A. No ; the Pilot Life insurance was higher than the Peo-
ples' insurance; I could get more for my money. 
Q. He came to see you, didn't he, the Pilot Life man? 
A. None only my ag_ent where I had my insurance trans-
ferred from home up here. 
Q. The only two people in reg·ard to industrial life insur-
ance that you talked to since moving· to Norfolk are the Pilot 
agent and Mr. Sowell f 
A. Yes, sir; all I know anything about. 
Q. You moved to Norfolk wlien, Mrs. Parker f 
A. The 7th of September, 1940. 
Q. And before this application was signed you only saw 
the agent of the Peoples write that one application when Im 
signed the application? 
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A. My husband, he would say every day or two he was 
going to take out some, but he never did do it. 
Q. That one occasion when he signed the application was 
the first time you had ever seen the agent of the Peoples Life 
Insurance Company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Look at that, please, and see if that is Mr. Parker's 
signature. 
Mr. Kellam: Your Honor, I wish to object to the intro-
duction of this application for life insurance. 
page 21 ~ Under the statute it is required to ·be in a certain 
size type, and I am prepared to show it is not in 
t.hat size type and, for that reason, not admissible in evi-
dence. 
Mr. Rixey: I think I have a. rigl1t to identify it. iShe has 
referred to it in her direct evidence, that Mr. Parker did sign 
application for insurance, and how it was signed. 
(There was further argument by counsel with reference 
to the objection, and reference to the statute referred to.) 
The Court: I think that means where the application is 
attached to the policy for issuance of the policy and there is 
provision in the policy making it an integral part of the 
policy, but not to an ex parte application. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. I hand you this application and ask you to look at it 
and see if Mr. Gordon Parker signed that. 
A. I can't read; I don't know A from B. 
Q. Didn't you see Mr. Parker sign iU 
A. I seen him sign one; I can't say that was the one he 
signed. 
Q. Will you look at that and see if that is a receipt given 
to you (handing paper to witness) f 
A. Yes, that is a receipt. 
page 22 ~ Q. What does the receipt show? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Who was that given tof 
A. It was given to Mr. Parker. 
Q. Given to Mr. Parker f 
A. Well, we was both standing there. 
Q. You saw Mr. Sowell sign that receiptf 
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A. I seen him sign a paper, but I don't know what kind 
of paper he signed. 
Q. Who are you talking about; Mr. Pa.rkert 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't you state a moment ago on your direct examina-
tion when Mr. Kellam was examining you that your husband 
did sign the application Y · 
A. He did sign one, but I don't know whether that was the 
one or not. 
Q. Would you recognize his signature¥ 
A. No, 1Sir. I told you I can't read nor write. 
Q. You say you talked with Mr. Sowell when he came back 
and o::ff ered to give you the money back Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say you talked with Mr. Saunders¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This is Mr. Saunders here. Did you ever talk to this 
gentleman? This is Mr. Saunders, the Superin-
page 23 ~ tendent of the Peoples Life Insurance Company, 
of Norfolk. 
A. This was the Assistant Superintendent; that is wlm t 
he said he was. 
Q. You said it was Mr. ,Saunders, the Superintendent. Now 
you mean it was not Mr. Saunders; it was the Assistant Su-
perintendent Y 
A. Well, Lawyer Hall was there; he knows. 
Q. Who Wais there T . 
.A. Lawyer Hall, from North Carolina, was in the room. 
I was in the 1back there, just crazy, and he talked and talked 
and talked and I don't know what all he said, but Mr. Hall 
knows because he was sitting there and heard it all. 
Q. Is Mr. Hall here today? 
A. (Addressing her counsel) Is Mr. Hall, from North 
Carolina, here Y 
Mr. Kellam: You will have to answer whether you know 
or not. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Have you seen him? 
A. I haven't seen him today. 
Mr. Rixey: That ~ all; stand aside. ·wm your Honor 
excuse the jury now? I want to make a motion. 
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(The jury retired from the courtroom.) 
Mr. Rixey: Your Honor, I want to move to strike out 
the evidence of Mrs. Parker insofar as custom of the insur. 
ance company is concerned. She stated that since 
page 24 } moving to Norfolk in September, 1940, she has 
discussed insurance with two agents, one of the 
Peoples Life Insurance ·Company whom she saw for the first 
time on the day the application was signed; and that the 
other agent was the agent of the Pilot Life Insurance Com-
pany. I submit that that does not estabUsh · a custom in the 
Norfolk area. All of her other conversations were in Durham, 
North Carolina, where she lived before. I submit that is 
not sufficient evidence to establish a custom.: · 
The Court: Well, it may not of itself establish a custom, 
but it tencis to do so. You may establish a· custom by inter-
related evidence. I overrule the motion·. · 
Mr. Rixey: I note an exception. · 
(The jury returned to the jury box.) 
THELMA PARKER, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having ibeen duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. 163 A View Avenue. 
Q. That is Ocean View, Virginia? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are the daughter of 1\fr. Gordon Parker 
page 25 } and Mrs. Grace Parker t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "Fou live at home with your mother f 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Were you living at home with them in January, 1941 f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you in the home on January 7, when the agent 
from the Peoples Life Insurance Company came there 7 
A. Yes, sir, I was. 
Q. Tell the Court and jury-do you remember his name 1 
A. Mr. Sowell; I think that's what he said his name was . 
. Q. Tell the Court and jury what he had to say. 
A. Well, it was right after dinner and I was sitting there 
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reading:- •So he knocked on the door and mother went to 
the door and in a few minutes mother broug·ht him in and 
introduced him as Mr. Sowell, introduced him to the roomers 
and then introduced him to dad, and he said he was from the 
Peoples Life Insurance Company. Well, I didn't pay much 
attention to it then. I turned back to my reading, and a 
few minutes later I heard dad say he wouJd take out a policy 
for five hundred dollars and, as well as I remember, he asked 
dad a lot of questions, his name and address and how old 
he was and if he had ever had any sickness, and then he give 
dad a slip of paper to sign. I remember saying something 
to dad about I should be taking out some insur-
page 26 ~ ance too. He signed the piece of paper, and then 
dad got -up because he was going to the union meet-
ing, and as he started out the door dad said if he sent a doc-
tor to just send him around any old time about this time of 
afternoon. He said if the insurance was paid, $2.16 or $2.17, 
I don't remember, that it would ·be in full benefit. He saicl 
"If anything· happens to Mr. Parker you will be fully in-
sured as soon as you sign this paper. I didn't pay very 
much attention to it because he turned around and starte<l 
"talking to the other boarders, people that were in the room. 
Q. Was he paid any amount of money there? 
A. Yes; my mother paid him $2.17 or $2.16, I don't re-
member; and I don't remember clearly what mother did do 
with the receipt. 
Q. He gave her a receipt? 
A. He gave mother a receipt for the money she paid him 
and he said that it was in full benefi.t at that time. I know 
because I spoke up and asked l1im, I said '' If I take insur-
ance now will I be fully insured as soon as I pay you?'' But 
I thought I would wait until my job was more steady before 
I took it out. 
Mr. Kellam: You ma.y inquire. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Will you look at this application and see if that is Mr. 
Parker's sigilature on that line, please? 
A. Yes, 1Sir. 
page 27 ~ Q. Did you see your father sign iU 
A. Yes, I did. 
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Mr. Rixey: I want to offer this in evidence, if Your Honor 
please. 
Mr. Kellam: Your Honor, we object to it. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
(The paper offered is marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1.) 
Mr. Rixey: That is all. 
ROBERT HOWARD, 
a witness on behalf of the. plaintiff, ha.ving been duly sworn, 
testified as f ollow,s : 
Examined by Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Howard f 
A. 168 A View Avenue, Ocean View. 
Q. That is almost across the street from Mrs. Parker T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you living in the home of Mrs. Parker on J anu-
ary 7, 19411 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were married since that time and moved away? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you boarding there 7 
page 28 } A. Boarding there. 
Q. Were you present on the evening the gentle-
man from the Peoples Life Insurance Company called at the 
Parker home with reference to selling insurance? 
A. I was. 
Q. Tell the Court and jury what he had to say on that 
evening with reference to the policy he was trying to sell 
Mr. Parker. 
A. Well, g·entlemen, as far as I can remember-I didn't 
know this was coming up, I don't remember very much of 
it, but when he come in-by me remembering this, he tried 
to sell me an insurance and I already had one with the Metro-
politan and I was trying to get it straightened out, get it 
down here; I had just come down. I told him I already had 
one but if I would let it go I might take one out with him. 
He was trying to get us boys to take one. 
Then he asked Mr. Parker to take one. We was planning 
on going to town, Mr. Parker and me and one or two other 
•boys, I think, was g·oing to town. So he asked ·Mr. Parker 
to go ahead and fill out this application, answer the ques-
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tions. He says ''I will tell you; let my wife answer the 
questions. .She knows all my people and all the history; let 
her answer for you.'' He says '' You will have to sign this 
blank. He says '' Give me here and I will sign it;'' and he 
signed the blank. In the meantime, while he was 
page 29 ~ explaining this insuranr,e policy he said from the 
time he would write out this application blank and 
she paid him for this month, why it would go in effect, you 
see, at this particular time. So when we left they filled it 
out, and I wasn't there when he left. That is as far as I know 
about it. 
Q. Did you see the money paid? 
A. No, I didn't see the money paid because I wasn't there. 
Q. You did hear the agent tell him if: he did pay it it would 
be in full benefit from that time? 
A. Yes, I did hear him tell him that, because I taken out 
one with the Pilot-
Mr. Rixey: Don't tell what you did, J\fr. Howard. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
·Q. Mr. Howard, do you have any insurance with these in-
dustrial insurance companies, premiums payable weekly or 
monthly? 
A. Mine was supposed to be paid by the week but I tokl 
them I would rather pay it by the month. 
Q. Do you know what is the general custom among these 
industrial insurance agents with reference to representa-
tions that if premiums are paid immediately that insura.nm~ 
will go in to effect? 
Mr. Rixey: I think before he can answer a. question like 
that he would certainly have to be qualified ns 
page 30 ~ to whether he ever talked to agents about th~e 
matters. 
The Court: I overrule the objection. 
Mr. Rixey : Note the exception. 
Bv Mr. Kellam: 
·Q. Do yQu lmow what is the geneml custom among them; 
do they make representations that if you pay the premium 
then you are immediately protected Y 
A. Yes, sir. I have had t11e Gulf Life who sold me insur-
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ance tell me that, and I have taken it with the :Metropolitan, 
that I have got now. I was talking with Mr.-
Mr. Rixey: I object to a conversation. 
The Court: I sustain the objection. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Did you say you had not talked about this C8lSe witl1 
anybody? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You have talked with Mr. Kellam, haven't you! 
A. He come out and asked me was I there the night this 
policy was taken out. · 
Q. Where did you live before you came to Norfolk? 
A. I lived in Tuckertown, New .Jersey. 
Q. When did you come to Norfolk? 
A. I d~m't remember the date but October or November, 
along about the 1st of November. 
Q. You haven't talked with any agents about 
page 3}} taking insurance policies since you have been here 
except Mr. Sowell, have you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With whom? 
A. With Reynolds, I believe, with the Pilot; I believe that 
iis his name. 
Q. Anybody else 7 
A. No. 
Q. The other policies you spoke of were taken out before 
vou came to Norfolk? 
· A. Before I came to Norfolk, right. 
Q. How many times did you talk with Mr. Reynolds? 
A. Well, I talked with him wbout three times, I reckon, 
and before-I am not including Mr. Sowell the night he come 
there and was talking to us all, trying· to get us to take this 
insurance. 
Q. Did Mr. Reynolds try to write Mr. Parker some insur-
ance? 
A. No, not as I know of. I don't know about that. 
Q. How do you recall this particular day ,so clearly? 
A. Well, I told you we was in the house and he tried to 
get me to take one with him. 
Q. How many of you were in the room Y 
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A. I don't remember; it was the family and one or two 
of the boys. I don't remember how many was in the room. 
· Q. Yon listened to the whole conversation! 
page 32 ~ A. I listened as far as I was there. 
Q. Is this the signature of Mr. Parker {exhibit-
ing paper to witness) Y 
A. I wouldn't know. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Parlrnr sign an application f 
A. I was across the room from him when he signed it. I 
wouldn't know his signature. 
Q. You heard the conversation? 
A. I heard the conversation. 
Q. Didn't you see him get np and go to the table and sign 
iU 
A. I saw him sign it but didn ''t see hts handwriting. 
Q. You heard him tell his wife to give Mr . .Sowell the in-
formation to go in theref 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Rixey: Stand aside. 
DOROTHY HAWKINS, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been duly swon1, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Tell the Court and jury your name, please. 
A. Mrs. Dorothv Hawkins. 
page 33 ~ Q. Where do YQU live? 
A. 163 A View, Apartment 3. 
Q. Ocean . View T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mrs. Hawkil1iS, do you carry any industrial life insur-
ance on your life or a.ny members of your family! 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been carrying that? 
A. Well, I have so many different ones. The latest one 
I took out about three years ago, to the best of my knowl-
edge. 
Q. Are you familiar with tlie general custom among in-
dustrial insurance agents with reference to representations 
as to when the policy will take effect if premiums are paid 
immediately? 
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Mr. Rixey: Your Honor, I object to that for the reasons 
stated heretofore, and also for the further reason that the 
last policy she took out was three years ago. There is no 
evidence she knows of any such custom. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Rixey: Exception. 
A. Well, may I say something? 
Q. Wait just a minute so we will get the record straight. 
The question was are you familiar with the g~m-
page 34 ~ eral custom among industrial insurance · agents 
with referenc.e to representations as to when the 
policy will take effect if premiums are immediately paid. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is that cu~tom? 
A. May I say my sister took out one T She was living in 
the hou;se with me; just six weeks ago, and it was with the 
same company I 11ave mine, and he told her it was-
Mr. Rixey: I object to the conversation. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Don't tell what he said. What is the general custom Y 
Do they sa.y when the policy will take effect? 
A. He told her-
Q. Not what he told her. What do they tell everybody? 
A. That it would take effect immediately if she would pay 
him four weeks in advance. 
Q. Is that the general custom among them f 
A. That is what I have always been told. 
Mr. Kellam: You may inquire. 
CROStS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. You formed your opinion with reference to that being· 
the general custom by that one instance? 
A. No; I have different insura.nces. I can tell you the dif-
ferent companies I have. 
page 35 ~ Q. How long have you been living in Norfolk? 
A. Ten months. 
Q. Where did you come from T 
A. Richmond, Virg-inia. 
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Q . .And all your policies were taken out in Richmond T 
A. Yes; all my persona] policies. · 
Q. And since you have come to Norfolk you have talked 
to one agent about it Y 
A. Yes. 
·Q. And that is the one you just mentioned? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that is the only knowledge you have with regard 
to what the custom may be hereY 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Rixey: Stand aside. 
FLORENCE PERRY, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Mrs. Perry, tell the Court and jury yoU, name, please. 
A. Florence Perry. 
Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Perry? 
A. At 163 A View Avenue. 
page 36 ~ Q. That is Ocean View, Norfolk? 
A. Ocean View, yes. 
Q. Do you have any insuranee wit.h an industrial insur-
ance company; that is, where the premium is payable weekly 
or every four weeks Y 
A. Yes, I have insurance on my children in the Pilot Life 
Insurance Company. 
Q. Will you state to the Court and jury if you know what 
JJS the general custom among agents of industrial insurance 
companies as to when policies will take effect if premiums 
a re immediately paid T 
Mr. Rixey: Note the same objection, your Honor. 
The Court : Overruled. 
Mr. Rixey: Exception. 
A. Well, I don't know just what you mean. 
Q. What representations do agents make; what do they 
tell you as to when the policy will take effect? 
Mr. Rixey: It is not a question of what the agents tell 
her. He asked her for the custom. 
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The Court:: I think that is all right. 
Mr. Rixey: He is asking what the agent told her. 
The Court:: I think that is all right. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. What is that¥ 
A. Well, whenever Ihave taken any policies they ha.ve told 
me if I paid the premium it would be covered or 
page 37} protected immediately; that the insurance would 
go into effect immediately. In fact, I didn't feel 
like I could take out the full amount a.t the time I took them; 
wanted to take out five hundred dollars, and I have three 
children -but I :figur'ed I ·couldn't take it out all at one time, 
and he suggested I take two hundred and fifty and pay it 
that day so that they would be covered; and then I changed 
it to a five hundred d:ollar policy later. 
Q. Is that the usual cu.stom among agents of insurance 
companies; are those· representations usual? 
A. Whatever experience I have had with them, it is. 
Mr. Kellam: You may inqui1:e. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Your experience is confined to the Pilot Insurance Com-
pany? 
A. No, I have had experience with other insurance com-
panies, but not just recently. 
Q. Where did you come from t 
A. Wisconsin. 
Q. When did you come 7 
A. It will be a year in September. 
Q. You have had no experience with insurance companies 
since, you came to Norfolk 1 
A. None except the Pilot. 
page 88 }- Q. That is the only one you have reference to 1 
A. That is all. 
Mr. Rixey: That is all. 
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a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been duly sworn, 
testified· ·as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Yon are Mrs. Robert Howard f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Yon live at Ocean View in the City of Norfolkf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mrs. Howard, are you familiar with the general custom 
among industrial insurance agents, that is, insuranee com-
panies who sell policies with premiums payable weekly or 
every four weeks, with reference to representations made 
by them as to when the policy will take effect if premiums are 
immediately paid Y 
Mr. Rixey: The same objection; same exception. 
A. Well, any I have ever heard, when you apply for it 
and. pay for it right then, yon are in full benefit even though 
you haven't got your policy. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
page 39 } By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. You are the wife of Mr. Robert Howard! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did yon come to Norfolk Y 
A. I came here in January. 
Q. January of this yeart 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you talked to any insurance agent :since you have 
been hereY 
.A. Yes, sir; I have taken out insurance. 
Q. Which one 7 
A. With the Pilot. 
Q. The agent of the Pilot; that is the only oneY 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Mrs. Howard, did you particularly discuss that phase 
of insurance with the agent for the Pilot? 
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Mr. Rixey: Counsel should not put words in tl1e witness's 
mouth. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Did you discuss that particular phase with the agent, 
as to when the policy would be in effect Y 
A. Yes, sir, we did. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. That was the Pilot Life Insurance Company t 
page 40 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Kellam: Your Honor, this witness is a printer, to 
testify to the type of the application. 
The Court: Let the jury retire just a minute. 
( The jury retired from the courtroom.) 
A. M. WAGNER, 
a witness for the plaintiff, having been duly sworn, testified 
as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Kellam: 
Q. You live in the city of Norfolk, Mr. vVagnerY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your occupation Y 
A. Printer. 
Q. You are connected with the Reliance Press? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Rixey: If Your Honor please, to keep the record 
straight, I object to this evidence as -being immaterial. 
The Court: I overruled the objection. 
By Mr. Kellam: · 
Q. Mr. Wagner, look at the printing· of this application, 
and particularly the printing beginning with the words ''I 
hereby apply for insurance" and ending with the words "and 
the ,same is delivered to me", and tell us what 
page 41 r size type that is. 
A. It is 6-point, what is known as 6-point or 
Nonpareil. 
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Q. Now what size type is 8-point, or Brevierf 
A. Well, that is a size larger. 
Q. That is a size larger than this 1 
A. Yes; or really it is two sizes larger. 
CROSS EXAl\HNATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Part of the typed portion is in 8-point type, isn't it? 
A. Yes; the heading is in type even larger, some of it. 
Mr. Rixey: That is all. 
Mr. Kellam: While the jury is out I want to make a mo-
tion to strike out the application from the evidence for this 
additional reason so stated. 
( Counsel further argued the motion stated.) 
Mr. Rixey: If your Honor please, at this time I desire 
to make two motions. One is to strike out the evidence of-
fered by the plaintiff insofar as attempted proof of custom, 
on the ground that there is no evidence of such custom in 
the City of Norfolk. There is evidence that the agent of tlu~ 
Pilot Life Insurance Company on three occasions-with every 
witness it was the Pilot Life Insurance Companv 
page 42 ~ -that that was their custom, ·but there is no evi-
dence in this case that there was a general custom 
in the city of Norfolk to that effect; nor is there any evi--
dence there was a general custom of the Peoples Life Insur-
ance Company; nor is there any evidence that this c:ustom 
established by the Pilot Life Insurance Company alone, as 
they c.all it a custom, was brought home or known to th0 
Peoples Life Insurance Company. For that reason I submit. 
Your Honor, that they have not established a custom, and 
I move that the evidence in regard to their establishment 
of a oustom be .stricken out. 
Second, I move your Honor to i:;trike out all the evidenc~ 
of the plaintiff; that they have not established a case to be 
submitted to the jury on the evidence. * ~" * I respectfullv 
submit that the evidence shows there has been no contra~t 
and the evidence should be stricken out and judgment entered 
for the defendant. 
(There was further argument ;lJy counsel on the motion~) 
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The Court: I overrule the motion to strike the testimony. 
Mr. Rixey: I note an exception, Your Honor. 
page 43 } C. L. SAUNDERS, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Rixey: 
Q. State your name, please .. 
A. C. L. Saunders. 
Q. Mr . .Saunders, what is your connection with the Peo-
ples Life Insurance Company T 
A. Manager of the Norfolk District. 
Q. Mr. Saunders, there has been some evidence here in 
regard to what is the custom as to when the policies become 
effective upon the signing of an application. Will you please 
tell the Court and jury w11at is the custom in this vicinity 
in rega.rd to the application for and issuance of policies Y 
A. All industrial policies are effective on the date of is-
suance of the policy. 
Q. Now what is the custom relative to the payment of 
premium in advance? 
A. Well, our company will not issue a policy unless the 
premium has been paid. 
Q. N~w, when the policy is issued, what date does the 
policy bear? 
A. The da.te of the delivery of the policy. For instance, 
an application is written this week; the policy is is.sued the 
third Mondayi from this week, dated on that Monday. 
Q. What happens to the application in the mean-
page 44 ~ time Y It is taken, say, on the 7th of January. 
Wbat happens to that application! 
A. The application is written by the a.gent, turned in to 
our office the following morning; then the following Satur-
day the applications are all mailed to our home office. 
Q. Where is your home offic.e 1 
A. In Washington. 
Q. And about how long· does it take the home office to in-
vestigate the applications? 
A. Two weeks before the policy is issued. They usually 
take one week to investigate the application. 
Q. Then the policy will come down in about three weeks, 
if it is issued? 
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A. Yes, sir, on the third Monday from the week it is writ-
ten. 
Q. And it bears date of the third Monday¥ 
A. Yes, sir; if it isn't held up due to investigation. Some-
times it is four or five weeks. 
Q. And the premium that has been paid applies to what 
period? 
A. From tl\e date of issuance of the policy on. 
Q . .So that the policy is not issued :bearing the date of the 
application T 
A. No, sir. 
page 45 r Q. And there is no premium charged for the pe-
riod running between the date of application and 
the date of the policy! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Any premium that is paid is credited for the time after 
the date of the policy? 
A. That's right. If the policy is dated on the 2nd and 
there is four weeks paid, the premium receipt book is dated 
for the 2nd, 9th, 16th, and so on, four weeks from the date 
of issuance of the policy. 
Q. Is that the general custom in Norfolk Y 
A. It is. 
Q. Did this application pass through your hands f 
A. Through my office. 
Q. In the course of business, where did it g·oT 
A. To the home office, W a.shington. 
Q. Was that policy ever accepted Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What happened to it! 
A. It was reje~ted. 
Q. Tha.t is stamped on the face of it, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It was rejected by the home office 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you tender back to Mrs. Parker the premiums 
paidf 
page 46 ~ A. I instructed the agent to tender them. I did 
not personally; haven't seen her before today. 
Q. Mrs. Parker testified Mr. Sowell came and offered the 
premiums back to her. 
A. Yes, sir. She wouldn't accept it, and I instructed one 
of my assistant superintendents to explain to her and. offer 
Peoples Life Insurance Company v. Grace Parker 47 
C. L. Saunders. 
her the premiums in full; which he did, and she wouldn't ac-
cept that. 
Q. How long have you been in the insurance business T 
A. Twenty-eight years. 
Q. How long ha.ve you been in the insurance business in 
Norfolk? 
A. I have ·been with this company twenty-one years. 
Q. In NorfolkY 
A. Yes, sir; have been in Norfolk twenty-four years in the 
insurance business. 
Q. Mr. Saunders, do your solicitors have any authority to 
bind the company in stating that the policy will be issued 
immediately 7 
Mr. Kellam: Your Honor, I object to that. We call for 
the records from the home office or some records of the com-
pany rather than an agent. He is not competent to testify 
to what authority agents have. 
Mr. Rixey: He has complete charge of the Norfolk office.· 
He has attempted_ to .prove it by custom and I 
page 4 7 } think he has a right to say what their authority is. 
Mr. Kellam: The most he could say would be 
what his instructions were, and unless they were acceptable 
to the company they wouldn't be binding on anybody. It is 
for the records of the company, not for Mr. Saunders to 
testify. 
The Court: Well, if he knows whether or not soliciting 
agents have any authority, express authority, to bind the 
company, he may testify to that. It must be of his own 
lmowledge. He is not to be permitted to give his opinion 
about it .. 
By Mr. Rixey: . 
Q. Mr. Saunders, do all of the soliciting· agents in the Nor-
folk territory come under you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether or not they have authority to 
bind the company on applications? 
A. They do not. 
Q. You know that T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. W4at authority do they have 7 
A. They are instructed to inform the applicants that the 
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policy will not be in force until the policv is delivered to the 
applicant. · 
Q. And that is contained in the application, printed in 
there, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 48 ~ Q. You say in this case this policy was never 
issued but was rejected T 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q. Do you make the contracts with the soliciting agents Y 
A. For employment? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that a written contract f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. A verbal contract between you and the soliciting agents Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. You employ all the soliciting agents for this territory? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say it usually takes three weeks for the applica-
tion to be acted on? 
A. Well, the policy is issued on the third Monday follow-
ing the week on which the application is written. 
Q. Would it ,be possible for an application made on the 
7th day of January to be acted upon by the 14~h day of Jan-
uary? 
Mr. Kellam: I object to that, Your .. Honor. 
page 49 ~ How would he know whether it would be possible 
or not? He sends it to the home office and thev 
might do it the following· day. · 
The Court: He might give his reasons for that statement. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Why wouldn't it be possible? 
A. You mean for the policy to be issued? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Because it isn't possible. It's written, we will say, on 
the 7th. It isn't mailed-
Q. Let me get the day of the week that was, for instance. 
A. Monday, I think that was the day. 
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Q. The application is dated on Tuesday, the 7th of Janu-
ary. 
A. They are mailed from my office here on the following 
Monday so that they arrive at our home office on Tuesday, 
and then the policies are received back from the home office 
the following Saturday for delivery the following Monday, 
and dated the following Monday. 
Mr. Rixey: That is all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Mr. Saunders, since your employment with the Peoples 
Life Insurance Company you have been stationed 
page 50} at Norfolk, have you not, for the entire time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have never been in the home office, stationed in 
the home office? 
A. Not stationed there, no. 
Q. Mr. ,Saunders, what is the purpose of requiring the 
applicant to pay the premium in advance? 
A. To show their good faith in accepting the policy when 
it is issued; and another thing, if they pay four weeks the 
a.gent doesn't have to call but once a month: H_e delivers the 
policy and receive.s the money; he doesn't have to go back 
for four weeks. 
Q. A lot of them pay weekly, do they not! 
A. That's right. 
Q. And only pay one weekly payment in advance? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Why would you require some to pay four weeks and 
some to pay only one week in advance? 
A. We don't require them to pay four weeks. 
Q. You do not require th.e1!1 to pay any in advance? 
A. Yes, .sir; one week, a m1mmum of one week. Mr. Kellam, 
if you will permit me to say this: No company in Norfolk 
that I know of issues a policy in immediate benefit, or pufa, 
insurance in immediate benefit when one week is paid. This 
custom you are ref erring to, I think there are 
page 5l ~ two companies here that have binding receipts 
that they use when a certain amount is paid. If 
that binding receipt isn't used, then the company isn't obli-
gated for the insurance when the application is written. 
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Q. They do issue binding receipts? 
A. They issue binding receipts. 
Q. They are obligated, of course, from that very time Y 
A·. But it isn't a custom. 
Q. You don't know, of course, whether there are any others 
or notT 
A. All the others I know of do not. 
Q. How long has Mr. Sowell been connected with your 
company? 
A. About a year, I believe, Mr. Kellam. 
Q. Now, Mr. Saunders, when yon all employ an agent, be-
fore he can secure a license you are required to certify to 
his good character to the Insurance Commissioner or State 
Corporation Commission, and that he has not made fraudu-
lent representations,. and things of that sort? 
A. The Insurance Department requires us to furnish them 
with three letters of recommendation. That is mailed to the 
Insurance Department with the application for license. 
Q. That is in Richmond? 
A. That is in Richmond. 
Q. Doesn't it require an official of your company Y 
A. It requires a report. I order a report through 
page 52 ~ my office from either Hooper-Holmes Bureau or 
the Retail Credit Bureau, and he is employed ac-
cording to that report. 
Q. In addition to that, an officer of your company is re-
quired by statute to certify to the Insurance Commissioner 
of his good character T · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That has not ibeen made, to your knowledge? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Will you testify it has not been made Y 
A. Not to my knowledge ; I have never heard of it. 
Q. Then you don't know whether the company does that 
or noU · 
A. When I employ a man here the company don't know 
he is employed until he is on the payroll and has worked a 
week and my report goes to the home office showing his salary 
has been paid. 
Q. Instructions which are given to agents are given by you, 
are · they not? 
A. Either me or my superintendents. 
Q. They are given orally 7 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
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Q. You don't give any of them written instructions Y · 
A. Well, we do have written instructions, sure; we have 
written instructions and also have oral. We have a set of 
rules that is given to each man when he comes 
page 53 } with the company, and of cour.se he has oral in-
structions also. 
Q. You did not, of course, reject the application Y 
A. I did not., no, sir. 
Q. Do you: remember shortly after tl1e death of Mr. Parker 
Mr. C. W. Hall, an attorney of Durham, North Carolina, com-
ing to your office Y 
A. No, sir, he didn't come to my otlice. I had a letter 
from him, had two or three letters from him, but I never did 
see him. 
Q. You didn't talk to him, but you don't know whether he 
talked to your assistant T 
A. I retract that statement. I never have talked to him. 
If he came to my office, I don't know, but I don't think he 
did. My clerks didn't inform me of that. 
Q. Mr. Saunders, you .were in Richmond a few days after 
the death of Mr. Parker, were you noU 
A. I don't recall, Mr. Kellam. I am up there about every 
three months. I don't recall just what time I was up there. 
I haven't ever discussed at Washington this application with 
any of the officials in tl1e home office. 
Q. You have noU 
A. No, sir. 
!fr. Kellam: That is all. 
Mr. Rixey: If Your Honor please, we were going to take 
some examinations of the Underwriter-Examiner 
page 54 } of the Peoples Life Insurance Company in Wash-
ington, D. C., and to save that expense Mr. Kellam 
agreed he would testify to the facts I will read now. 
Mr. Kellam: Subject to objections. 
The Court : Let this gentleman come back on the stand. 
I am not through with him. 
( The witness returned to the stand.) 
By the Court: 
Q. Why was this application rejected? 
A. Mr. Rixey, I think, bas the report, Your Honor, on 
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that. It was due to physical defects as well as some other 
things. 
Q. When was it rejected Y 
A. As soon as the company had their report from Hooper-
Holmes or the Retail Credit concern. Mr. Rixey has the 
report here. 
Mr. Rixey: Your Honor, you have asked for reasons. I 
have1 the report from the Retail Credit Association I will be 
glad to submit. 
Mr. Kellam: We object to it. 
The Court: I .sustain the objection. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Mr. Saunders, you don't know of your own knowledge 
when this policy was rejected, do you? 
A. I don't remember. The date is on that re-
page 55 ~ port. I can't recall the date. 
Q. You don't know who rejected it, what of-
ficer or official in the company Y 
A. Mr. Bersuahaip. is the one who has charge of those in-
vestigations. 
Q. I mean you don't know who rejected it of your own 
knowledge? 
A. Personally I don't know who rejected it. Th~ usual o·ie 
who makes the investigation rejected it; it all goes through 
the same channels. 
Q. Did you notify Mrs. Parker that the policy had been 
rejected Y 
A. Did I notify her Y 
Q. Yes, sir; in writing or-
A. I don't recall whether I did or not. 
Q. Do you know whether or not you ever wrote Mrs. 
Parker or sent her written notice this policy had been re-
jected under the application f 
A. I didn't send her written notice. If she was informed 
of that it was through my superintendent, Mr. Barnes. 
Mr. Rixey: I would like to introduce this, if Mr. Kellam 
wants to make his exceptions. 
(The jury retired from the courtroom.) 
Mr. Rixey: Your Honor, I don't have any idea what his 
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objection to the evidence is. It was agreed that 
page 56 } if he were here he would testify to these facts. · I 
suppose that I had better read the agreed state-
ment first and then he can state his objections. 
(Reading) "It is under.stood and agreed that were Wil-
liam L. Bersuaham, Underwriter-Examiner of Peoples Life 
Insurance Co., present, he would testify as follows: 
'' That his duties require him to pass upon applications 
made to Peoples Life Insurance Co. and to determine whether 
they will be accepted or not. 
'' That in the case of Gordon A. Parker the application 
for life insurance came to his attention and in usual course 
of business, the application was referred to investigators 
for a report. That a report was submitted by the investig·a-
tors and, from the report, it was determined that the appli-
cation would not be accepted. That no policy on the life of 
Gordon A. Parker was issued or would be issued.'' 
Mr. Kellam: Your Honor, my objection is this: I agreed 
with Mr. Rixey that were the man present he would testify 
to this, subject to my objection, of eourse. There is no date 
set in here as to when the application came to him, as to 
whether prior to the death of Mr. Parker; no date as to when 
the rejection was filed by him; no reason stated in 
page 57 ~ his testimony as to why the application was re-
jected or when the application was rejected, or 
whether the money was tendered back or how it was tendered 
back to the applicant; whether or not he was then advised 
that Mr. Parker was dead; or any of those facts. 
In addition to that, Your Honor, from the testimony be-
fore the Court at this time it is perfectly apparent that 1.\fr. 
Parker was already dead at the time the application came 
to the Underwriter-Examiner. That being so, he couldn't 
take an arbitrary attitude and .sa.y: If I reject this applica-
tion no liability can attach to my company; if I don't reject 
it liability will attach to my company. 
The Court: That is the reason I asked the question of 
this man as to when that rejection took place. 
Mr. Kellam: He doesn't know. ·when this statement was 
written, that is one particular thing I wanted put in tl1e rec-
ord; when it was rejected. 
Mr. Rixey: Mr. Saunders states that it bears the date 
on the report. 
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The Court: . It appears so far in the evidence, as I under-
stand Mr. Saunders, that this application was taken on Tues-
day and was not mailed away to Washington until on the 
following Monday, the 13th, and it could not have arrived 
until the 14th. When was it rejected T 
Mr. Rixey: It was rejected on the date of this 
page 58 } report, January 22nd. 
Mr. Kellam: There is no one here that knows 
that was the date. I was pa·rticularly anxious to have that 
embodied in the statement, and no one could tell me, although 
they had this statement before them. 
The Court: You objected to them showing· that it was 
rejected after the man was dead. 
Mr. Kellam: Mr. Saunders doesn't know when it was 
rejected; if he knew he could testify. This Underwriter-
Examiner can't take the position "I reject it" without set-
ting out his reasons· for rejecting it. It is not an impossible 
thing that they could have gotten two Gordon Parkers mixed 
up. 
Mr. Rixey: He sets forth his reasons in this statement: 
'' That in the case of Gordon A. Parker the application for 
life insurance came to his attention and in the usual course 
of business the application was referred to investigators for 
a report. That a report was submitted by the investig·a.tors 
and from the report it was determined that the application 
would not be accepted. That no policy on the life of Gordon 
A. Parker was is.sued or would be issued.'' 
Now it is not necessary for the insurance company to as-
sign its reasons why they did not accept it. The reports 
obtained from these credit assooiations are con-
page 59 } fidential, a.s we know. They don't want to be in-
volved in any suits for defamement of character, 
or what not; and it is not necessary for them to say this 
man was guilty of fraud in 1939, or beat his wife in 1938, or 
did something in 1937 which would cause the company to 
reject the poliey. They don't have to assign their reasons. 
If they don't want to issue a policy of insurance to me, the 
law doesn't make them take my application. 
The Court: Well, certainly, an insurance company ought 
not to be permitted to gain any advantage hy rejecting an 
application for insurance after the insured is dead. 
Mr. Rixey: The case I have just read your Honor held 
that where an application ha~ been made and the man dies 
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before it is acted upon, it is automatically cancelled of it-
self. 
The Court: I construe that to mean no rejection is neces-
sary; that rejection becomes immaterial. 
Mr. Rixey: I take it that in the case of death before the 
approval of the application, it is automatically revoked. 
The Court: How is the question of rejection of this ap-
plication pertinent to this case, if made after the death of 
the insured? · 
page 60 ~ Mr. Rixey: It is for this purpose: Mr . .Saun-
ders has stated in his examination that in the 
usual course of business those applications are submitted to 
the company an-d the company, if accepted, returns the policy. 
I want to show that in the usual course of business this ap-
plication was received by the company, was assigned to the 
investigators, and from the report of the investigators, it 
was deduced the application would be rejected. 
The Court: I don't think that testimony would have any 
bearin~ at all upon this case without a showing as to when 
the rejection was made, because if the rejection was made 
after the death of the insured the liability then attached, if 
this agent had authority to make the contract. I\ sustain the 
objection. 
Mr. Rixey: I note an exception. 
(The jury returned to the jury box.) 
R. E. STANLEY, 
a witness on -behalf of the defendant, having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Will you state your name, please? 
A. R. E. Stanley, or Raymond E. 
page 61 ~ Q. Mr. Stanley, you are the Superintendent of 
the Home Beneficial Association in Norfolk¥ 
A. That's right. 
Q. You are in charge of the Norfolk district 7 
A. That's right. 
Q. How long have you been connected with the Home Bene-
ficial Association? 
A. Sixteen years. 
Q. And how long have you been in the Norfolk district? 
A. Five years. 
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Q. The Home Beneficial Association writes industrial in-
surance, does it not? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Does it write a large volume Y 
A. We think an enormous volume. 
Q. ·wm you tell us, please, Mr. Stanley, what your custom 
is in Norfolk as regards the accepting of an application, as 
to whether or not it is the custom that upon receipt of the 
application the policy is in immediate benefit Y 
The Court: I don't understand that is quite the point. 
Mr. Rixey: Let me state it a little differently. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Will you state whether or not it is the custom in the 
city of Norfolk for the soliciting agents to tell 
page 62 ~ the insureds that the policies are in immediate 
effect upon the signing of the application and the 
payment of some premium. 
Mr. Kellam: If he knows. 
A. No, sir, that is not the rule. 
Q. Is that a custom in the city of Norfolk? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. What is the custom? 
A. It is customary when the application is ta.ken from the 
applicant that a receipt is g·iven, if payment is made, sub-
ject to the approval of the company. That does not show 
just when that policy will be issued, but it is customarily two 
to three weeks. When that receipt is given, that receipt is 
given if the company accepts the application. If the com-
pany accepts the application and issues the policy, that policy 
is in force on the date of delivery of the policy. In the event 
the company does not accept the application, the receir>t is 
returned to the company and the premium is returned. 
Q. Is it customary for the agents to tell the applicants 
t.haU 
A. It is customary for the agents of all companies I know 
anything about, Mr. Rixey. 
Q. To tell the applicant f 
A. To inform the applimrnt that the policy is 
page 63 ~ not in force until the delivery of the policy. 
Q. And how many industrial companies are 
there in the city of Norfolk that you know off 
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A. I don't believe I can answer that question; all of twenty 
or more. 
Mr. Rixey: That is all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Mr . .S-tanley, you are a salesman yourself, are you 7 
A. No, sir; have been. 
Q. You haven't been in the last few years? 
A. I have a license a.s salesman. I am assigned to the 
office for office duties mostly. 
Q. And have been for the last five years? 
A. That's right. 
Q. How many agents do you have working under you? 
A. Thirty-five. 
Q. Do you go out with those thirty-five salesmen or agents 
when they make sales? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know what representations they make to ap-
plicants, do you? 
A. No, ,sir, we have no guarantee of that, but each agent 
is properly instructed along that line. We have no g-uarantee 
of what is told to the a.pplicant. 
page 64 } Q. You don't know what statement he makes to 
them, do you? 
A. That would be impossible to know. 
Q. Do you know how many agents any of the other com-
panies have in Norfolk? 
A. Yes, sir, there are a number of other companies that 
have as many agents as we do. 
Q. You have never been out with them selling either, have 
you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know what representations they make to the 
applicant either? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Does your company issue what is known as a binding 
receipt? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. There are some companies that do, are there not Y 
A. I am not familiar with them. It occurs to me-
Q. I don't want you to state if you don't know. 
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A. I am not familiar with any company that issues a bind-
ing receipt. 
Q. Have you one of the form of your receipts that you give 
with you! 
A. No, sir, not with me. 
Q. Do you state in that receipt there is no lia-
page 65 } bility on the company Y 
A. That ts right; and in the policy too. 
Q. You state that in the receipU 
.A. That's right. 
Q. In the receipt an agent g·ives the applicant for the 
premium! 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you put that in there for the purpose of advising 
the applicant as to what his-
A. That's right. 
C. L. SOWELL, 
a. witness on behalf of the defendant, having been first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Rixey: 
Q·. State your name, please. 
A. C. L. ,Sowell. 
Q. You are employed by the Peoples Life Insurance Com-
panyf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were summonsed here by the plaintiff, weren't 
youY 
A. Yes. sir. 
· Q. On January 7, 1941, how long had yon been 
page 66 ~ working for the Peoples Life Insurance Company Y 
A. .Approximately four months. 
Q. Mr. Sowell, in taking applications do you have the au-
thority to make a contract at that time, or do the applica-
tions have to be submitted to the home office°! 
Mr. Kellam: I object to that. It is a leading question, 
and I don't think he has a right to state what his authority 
is. That is a question for the Court to determine from the 
facts and circumstances. 
The Court: He has a right to state whether he ha.s ex-
press authority to do it. Of course, it is a question of law 
whether he ha.s implied authority. 
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Mr. Kellam: I think that is right. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. Answer the question, please. 
A. I have not. 
Q. You knew you didn't have authority to do it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Sowell, how did you happen to go to the Parker 
home! 
A. An agent for the Pilot Life Insurance Company left 
a note at one of our policy holders' homes for me to call by and 
see Mr. Parker; that he was in the market for some insur-
ance. 
Q. You went there at the request of an agent of the Pilot 
Lifet 
Pilot Lifef 
page 67 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Parker¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you talk with him about insurance 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you get his application T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that his application (exhibiting paper to witness) Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vas that signed in your presence Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it given to him to read before he signed it 7 
A. He had the application approximately a minute or two, 
I am not sure. I was talking to Mrs. Parker or some other 
members of the family while he had it. He had it, but it was 
a short time. 
Q. He had time to read it? 
A. Time to read the contract, yes, sir. 
Q. He signed it Y 
A. He signed it. 
Q. Now, Mr. Sowell, did you state to Mr. Parker-
Mr. Kellam: Ask him what he did state; don't suggest the 
answer to him. Your Honor, I object to sug·gesting the an-
swer to him in his question. 
page 68 ~ The Court: Let him ask the question, and then 
your objection can be passed on. 
60 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
0. L. S o·well. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. State whether or not you made a statement to Mrs. 
Parker or Mr. Parker to the effect that the policy was in im-
mediate benefit upon the signing of the application 1 
A. I don't recall having· been asked that question. 
Q. Well, did you make the statement voluntarily? 
A. No, sir; I never make those statements unless asked. 
Q. Now when you take an application, what do you do with 
iU 
A. ,v e submit it to the office, which submits it to the home 
office. 
Q. It is customary among agents in the city of Norfolk to 
tell the applicants that the policy is in immediate benefit? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That is the date of the application, the 7th day of J anu-
aryY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was present there that night, do you recalU . 
A. Mrs. Parker and one or two gentlemen, and I beheve 
Mrs. Parker's daughter. I am not sure exactly how many, 
but I know there were at least four or five. 
Q. Now you did go back to Mrs. Parker's home later and 
offer to return the premiums, did you not 1 
page 69 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would she accept them f 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Rixey: That is all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Mr. Sowell, when did you go back to the Parker home f 
A. Well, I went to the Parker home the next day after tho 
accident and no one was home, so I waited, I guess, a week 
before I went back, or until I seen some activity around the 
house. I passed there quite often but I dicln 't see anything 
stirring so I didn't stop until I was sure someone was home. 
Q. Did you carry the money in cash? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you take it out and offer it to her in cash? 
A. "When I suggested to Mrs. Parker I would return her 
premium, she said she wouldn't accept, so I never brought 
any money out. 
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Q. Well, now, Mr. Sowell, you went ha.ck the day after the 
accident, you said Y 
A. I went back the day after the accident. 
Q. He was killed on the 14th, was he not? 
A. I don't recall the exact date; that is what I 
page 70 } have here. 
Q. He was killed about a week after the appli-
cation was taken f 
A. Yes, sir. The application was taken on the night of the 
6th, I think, and it was dated the 7th because it went in on 
the 7th, the morning of the 7th. 
Q. Went into the home office, you mean f 
A. Went into our office here in Norfolk. 
Q. When did it go into the home office f 
A. I don't know when it went into the home office. We 
submit them every day as of the previous day's business. 
Q. You don't lmow wha.t action the company had taken 
when you went back to Mrs. Parker's t 
A. No, sir ; we don't know that. 
Q. Why did you g·o back? 
A. I went back to offer the premium back because the com-
pany had stated that there was-
Q. Don't state what the company stated. 
A. I will have to state that; that is the only source of in-
formation I have. 
Q. What did you ask her when you went in to see her f 
A. I greeted her as normally as I could under the circum-
stances, because I was sure that things had been, you know, 
smooth; so after a short conversation I suggested to her she 
let me return the premium and she said she 
page 71 ~ wouldn't do it because she didn't think she should. 
Q. She felt she whaU 
A. That she shouldn't do it. 
Q. Did you ask her for the receipt.you had given her? 
A. Yes, sir; that was all in the course of the conversation. 
I would had to have had the receipt if I had refunded the 
$2.17. 
Q. Did you fill in the date of the application while you 
were at the Parker home? 
A. Mrs._Parker gave me the information on that after Mr. 
Parker had gone. 
Q. I asked you if you filled in the date of the application 
while you were at the Parker home? 
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A. I generally complete these applications iu the presence 
of the applicant. 
Q. I dian 't ask you what you generally did. Did you do 
it in this particular case 1 
A. Yes, sir ; I always do that. 
Q. You took it on the 6th and dated it on the 7th there that 
night? 
A. You see it couldn't possibly have gone into the office be-
cause the office wasn't open. 
Q. You say you have been with this company four months! 
A. I had been at that time. 
Q. What did you do prior to that time f 
page 72 ~ A_. I was with Pender Grocery Company. 
Q. How many industrial insurance agents ha.ve 
you been out with to make sales; that is up to that time, up 
until January 6th how many industrial insurance agents had 
you been out with in making sales T 
A. Well, I had been out with several. I don't exactly know 
how many, but I had been with several of the men in our 
office. 
Q. How about with any other company? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Then you don't know what is their custom with refer-
ence to representations as to when the insurance takes ef-
fect? 
A. I have had quite a few fellows make sales talks to me 
on insurance. 
Q. I mean when they are talking to the applicant¥ 
A. Only from what other people have talked to me, as just 
another possible applicant. 
Q. Who authorized you to go back and offer back the 
premium? 
A. My superintendent. 
Q. Mr. Saunders, you mean Y 
A. Mr. Barnes. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
page 73 ~ Q. Mr. Sowell, since that date you have not dis-
cussed this matter with Mrs. Parker Y 
A. Since the date I offered her the premiums Y 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Peoples Life Insurance Company v. Grace Parker 63 
Doitg,las P. Robertson. 
Q. You have never discussed this matter with her, have 
you? 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Rixey. That is our case, your Honor. 
Mr. Kellam: That is all. 
Mr. Rixey: I want to make a motion, if Your Honor please. 
( The jury retired from the court-room.) 
Mr. Rixey: Your Honor, at this time I would like to renew 
my motion to strike the evidence in the case on the grounds 
heretofore stated, and as supported further by the evidence 
of the defendants. 
The Court : Overruled. 
Mr. Rixey: Your Honor, I would like, as it is almost ad-
journing our-I had no idea they were going to attempt to 
prove any evidence of custom. I would like the privilege of 
putting one or two witnesses on after the adjournment hour 
in regard to custom. 
Mr. Kellam: Your Honor, I object to that. 
The Court : Your idea is to take an adjournment 
page 74 ~ until two-thirty? 
Mr. Rixey: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Kellam: I object to further testimony. He has stated 
to the Court that he rested his case. 
The Court: I understand. There has been no change in 
the situation. 
(Thereupon, at 1 :15 o'clock P. M., an adjournment was 
taken until 2 :30 o'clock P. M.:., when the proceedings were re-
sumed.) 
DOUGLAS P. ROBERTSON, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Rixey: 
Q. 1State your name, please. 
A. Douglas P. Robertson. 
Q. What is your business, Mr. Robertson? 
A. District Manag·er, Union Life Insurance Company. 
Q. How long have you been in the insurance business in 
the city of Norfolk Y 
64 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
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A. Twenty-one years. 
Q. Does the Union Life Insurance Company that you rep-
resent write industrial insurance? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
page 75 ~ Q. How much experience have you had in the 
field as an a.gent 1 
A. Eighteen years. 
Q. Mr. Robertson, state whether or not it is the custom 
among the soliciting agents for them to tell the prospects 
that upon signing the application and paying one or more 
premiums that the insurance is in immediate effect. 
A. Please repeat your question. 
( Question read by reporter.) 
A. That is not the custom. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Mr. Robertson, for the last twenty-one years you have 
been District Manager for the Union Life Insurance Com-
pany! 
A. Tho last three years I have been Manager for the Union 
Life Insurance Company. 
Q. Where were you prior to that three years? 
A. Agent in Norfolk, selling insurance. 
Q. With them T 
A. With them, yes. 
Q. You have not been an agent, of course, for the last three 
vears? 
·· A. Not an agent. 
Q. Exclusive of your own company, how many agents have 
you been with of industrial insurance companies 
page 76 ~ to assist in the making of a sale Y 
A. None other than my company. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rixey: 
Q. You wouldn't assist other agents to make sales for other 
c.ompanies, would you T 
A. No, sir. 
\ 
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RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Have you been in the presence of agents of other com-
panies when they were ma.king sales f 
A. I have been in their presence, in the presence of quite 
a few agents working for my company .. 
Q. I say other than your company. 
A. Very few. 
JOHN R. BARNES, 
a witness on behalf of the def endant1 having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Rixey: 
Q. State your name, please. 
A. John R. Barnes. 
Q. Mr. Barnes, what is your connection with the Peoples 
Life Insurance Company Y 
page 77 } A. Well, I have been with the Peoples Life In-
surance Company seventeen years, working in the 
field at all times. 
Q. You are still working in the field? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Barnes., state whether or not it is the custom among 
soliciting agents in the city of Norfolk to tell the prospects 
that upon the signing of the application and payment of one 
or more premiums that the policy is in immediate benefit. 
A. It is not. 
Q. It is not the custom 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. ]\fr. Barnes, I believe you went to the home of Mrs. 
Parker sometime a.fter the application was filed and offered 
to return the premiums Y 
A. That's right; yes, sir, I did. 
Q. Do you recall when that was? 
A. I don't recall exactly the date. It was approximately, 
I would say, about a week after the claim wa.s presented to 
the company-after Mr. Parker died. 
Q. She wouldn't accept the premium f 
A. No, sir. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
page 78 ~ By Mr. Kellam: 
Q. Mr. Barnes, you are in the office, are you 
noU 
A. No, sir. I work in the field assisting agents at all times. 
Q. You were not with Mr. Sowell on the evening he made 
this sale, were you T 
A. No, sir, I was not. 
Q. Mr. Barnes, do you recall having been in a conversation 
with a Mr. C. W. Hall, attorney, from Durham, North Caro-
lina, in connection with this Parker matter? 
A. No, sir. As far as I know I never have seen Mr. Hall 
in my life; wouldn't know him if I saw him. When I was 
down there that night a gentleman came in just as I was leav-
ing· the house. I e~cused myself and walked out. I wasn't 
introduced to him. I don't know who he was. He possibly 
could have been any one of many people. 
Q. As a matter of fact, wasn't he already sitting in the 
room at the time you went in 7 
.A.. No, sir, positively not. 
Q. ·w1io was there? 
A. I think there was Mrs. Parker, I believe that is her name 
-is that right y___.Mrs. Parker, I believe, and I believe it was 
her daughter; maybe her daughter and maybe one other. I 
don't believe there was over three people in the room and 
they were all ladies, when I walked in. 
Q. Where was Mrs. Parker, where did you talk 
page 79 ~ to her in what part of the house? 
A. She was in the living room when I walked 
in, the front room of the house. 
Q.- Was she sitting upf 
A. Sh~ was sitting down in a chair. 
Q. What did you tell her when you went in there Y 
A. I told her I had come to return the premium on the ap-
plication that was applied for by her to our company; that 
unfortunately the policy had not been accepted by the com-
pany, the policy had not been issued. 
Q. What day was tha.t when you went there? 
A. I couldn't tell you definitely because I don't remember. 
I know that it was within a week after he was killed. 
Q. Did you carry a check made payable to her Y 
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ca.se I would have returned the money in cash and taken up 
the receipt. · 
Q. What did she tell yon? 
A. She told me she wonldn 't give me the receipt; that she 
was going to see if she conldn 't collect it. 
Q. And she told you that was the only thing she had to 
show she had any policy, didn't she? 
.A.. I don't recall exactly whether she said that or not, but 
I recall she said she wouldn't give me the receipt; I recall 
that. 
page 80 ~ Mr. Rixey: We rest now. 
(End of testimony.) 
(During a short recess, the. following proceedings were had 
in the Judge's Chambers): 
Mr. Rixey: It is understood and agreed that all of the evi-
dence both for the plaintiff and for the defendant in regard 
to customs of soliciting agents telling prospects that they a.re 
immediately insured is stricken from the record. 
Now may we not agree to this: that in the event it is neces-
sary to write up this evidence, might it not be agTeed that 
all of the evidence relating thereto may be eliminated from 
the record T 
Mr. Kellam: Yes, sir, I think that is all right. 
Mr. Rixey: The defendant excepts to the Court's ruling in 
overruling the motion to strike out the evidence of the plain-
tiff for the reasons stated below: 
That the evidence of the plaintiff at ·best discloses that her 
husband was solicited by an ag;ent of the defendant company 
for insurance and that her husband, in the presence of the 
plaintiff, was advised that it was necessa.ry for the husband 
to sign an application, which application was 
. page 81 ~ signed by the proposed insured, and that the ap-
plication for insurance was rejected by the insur-
ance company; that the application states over the signature 
of the proposed insured tllat he agreed that no obligation 
should exist ag·ainst the defendant on account of the a.ppli-
cation, although he may have paid the premiums thereon, un-
less the company shall issue a policy in pursuance thereof, 
and the same be delivered to him; and the evidence shows 
clearly that the policy was never issued but was actually re-
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jected; that there was never a meeting of the minds between 
the proposed insured and the defendant. 
·That any evidence to the effect that the soliciting agent 
stated that the policy was in immediate force would not be 
binding upon the defendant company for the reason that the 
soliciting agent in making· such a statement, if he so did, was 
acting without authority and contrary to the rules of the com-
pany, and if he made such a statement he perpetrated a fraud 
upon the company which would not bind the company. 
That the insured, in signing the application for insurance, 
had prese·nted to him in writing the fact that the defendant 
company assumed no liability on account of the application, 
regardless of whether premiums were paid or not, 
page 82 ~ unless the company issued a policy in pursuance 
thereof and it was delivered to him; that the pro-
posed insured knew of this provision in the application and 
hence knew that any statements made to the contrary by the 
agent were unauthorized. 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 1-P (Granted): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that on the- 7th day of January, l94t, the defendant 
company through its ag·ent entered into an oral contract of 
insurance with Gordon Parker to insure him against loss of 
life by accidental means in a sum, of $1,000.00, with his wife, 
Grace Parker, as beneficiary, which contract of insurance wa; 
to take immediate effect and be in force from that day, and 
to be later evidenced by a written contract of insurance, in 
consideration for which the defendant company was paid 
$2.17 as premium thereon for four weeks, and that on the 
14th day of January, 1941, before the written contract was 
issued and delivered to the said Gordon Parker, he was acci-
dentally killed, and that the defendant has failed to pay said 
sum to the plaintiff, you should find for the plaintiff.'' 
Mr. Rixey: The defendant excepts to the action 
page 83 ~ of the Court in granting instruction marked '' In-
struction No. 1-P" on the g·round that there is no 
evidence to show that an oral conttact was entered into with 
Gordon Parker by anyone ha.ving-. authority to bind the de-
fendant company; that all the evidence was that the solicit-
ing· agent was not authorized to accept binding· contracts; 
I 
,:._I 
Peoples Lif~ Insurance Company v. Grace Parker 69 
tbat the soliciting agent was not authorized to advise the 
prospect that the policy would be issued and he would be 
covered immediately; that if the agent so advised the ptoposed 
insured he was acting without authority and, in acting, acted 
contrary to his principal and thereby perpetrated a fraud 
upon his principal; that the evidence shows that he only had 
authority to take applications, receive premiums and receipt 
therefor, and that the application would then be submitted to 
his local office and, in turn, to the home office for their accept-
ance or rejection, and as such notice of this authority was 
given to the proposed insured in the application which was 
signed by the insured at the time the application was taken, 
and he agreed in the application that there would be no con-
tract of insurance until the company had actually issued a 
policy in accordance with the application; that all the evi-
dence discloses that no policy was issued and that the appli-
cation was rejected and the premiums paid were 
page 84 } tendered back to the beneficiary. 
Defendant's Instriwtion ""4. (Refus.ed) : 
"The Court instructs the Jury that the signing of an ap-
plication and acceptance of a premium does not complete the 
,contract, and until the application is accepted, there is no 
contract. And if you b~lieve from the evidence that the ap-
plication was tejected, you should find for the defendant." 
Mr. Rixey: The defendant excepts to the Court's action 
in refusing to grant instruction marked ''A'' for the reason 
that the instruction sets forth the law in accordance with the 
law of contracts and the law of insurance contracts; that the 
instruction merely follows the application for the insurance 
made by Gordon A. Parker whereby he agreed that there 
would be no liability upon the company until the application 
was accepted; that any statements made by the soliciting· 
agent to the contrary were without authority and were acts 
of fraud upon the company. 
Defend0!i1,t's Instruction. B (Refused): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Gordon A. Parker signed the application for 
insurance and that no insurance policy was issued, 
pag-e 85 } you should find for the defendant.'' 
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Mr. Rixey: The defendant excepts to the action of the 
Court in refusing instruction marked "B" for the same rea-
son set forth in exceptions to instruction '' A'', which was 
likewise refused. 
Defendant's Instruction C .(Refused) : 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Gordon .A. Parker signed the application for in-
surance and that the insurance was rejected, you should find 
for the defendant." 
Mr. Rixey: The defendant excepts to tiie Court's action in 
refusing to grant instruction marked '' C'' on the ground that 
the evidence discloses that the application made by the pro-
posed insured was rejected by the company, and having been 
rejected there was no contract between the defendant com-
pany and Gordon ~ Parker or the beneficiary for the reason 
that the application filed specifically states that no liability 
or obligation existed against the company on account of the 
application unless the policy was actually issued. 
Defendant's Unnumbered Instritction ( Granted) : 
"The Court instructs the jury that the burden is upon the 
plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the 
page 86 ~ evidence that the defendant entered into a con-
tract of insurance with Parker, and unless you be-
lieve from the evidence that the plaintiff has met this burden 
you should find for the defendant.'' 
Before giving to the jury the instructions above set out as 
gTanted, the Court instructed the jury as follows: 
Gentlemen, on motion of the attorneys for the plaintiff and 
the attorneys for the defendant, the Court strikes out all 
the testimony that has been introduced either by the plaintiff 
or the defendant with respect to the custom or alleged cus-
tom of soliciting insurance agents to agree with applicants 
that the policies were in force from the time the application 
was made and the premiums paid. That is all stricken out 
and you gentlemen will pay no further attention to that in 
your deliberations on this case. 
page 87 ~ After the jury were instructed as above indi-
cated, the case was argued by counsel and submit-
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ted to the Jury. After consideration of the case the Jury re-
turned the following verdict : 
''We the jury find for the plaintiff in the sum of $1000.00. 
GEO. M. SHAW, foreman". 
Thereafter and on the same dav the defendant moved the 
Court to set aside the verdict of· the Jury and render final 
judgment for the defendant, or to grant a new trial on the 
following grounds: that the verdict is contrary to the law 
and the evidence and without evidence to support it, that the 
evidence fails to prove a binding contract of insurance, that 
the Court erred in granting Instruction No. 1-P, that the 
Court erred in refusing each of the instructions offered by 
the defendant, and that the Court erred in rejecting the tes-
timony of William L. Bersuaham. 
After arg·ument of said motion on a subsequent day the 
Court overruled said motion and rendered final judgment for 
the plaintiff on the verdict, to which action of the Court the 
defendant duly excepted. 
page 88 ~ JUDGE.'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, 0. L. Shackleford, Judge of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, who presided over the 
foregoing trial of Grace Parker v. Peoples Life Insurance 
Company of Washington, D. C., in the Court of Law anrl 
Chancery for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, on the 24th day 
of June, 1941, do certify that the foregoing is a true and cor-
rect transcript of all the testimony and evidence and all other 
incidents of said trial, including the motions and objections 
and the instructions offered by the respective parties, the 
action of the Court thereon, and the exceptions of the partie~ 
as therein set forth. 
Counsel for the parties having agreed that the original ex-
hibits introduced at said trial shall be transmitted to the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia as a part of the recor J 
in said cause, in lieu of certifying to said Court copies of 
said exhibits, I certify that the said original exhibits consist 
of the following, as set out in the foregoing report, which havC' 
been initialed by me for the purpose of identification: 
Defendant's Exhibit 1, Application for Insurance in Peo-
ples Life Insurance Company of Washington, D. C., dated 
January 7, 1941. 
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And I further certify that the attorney for the plaintiff 
had reasonable notice, in writing, given by counsel for the 
defendant, of the time and place when the foregoing tran-
script of the testimony and other incidents of said 
pa.ge 89 ~ trial would be presented to me for signature and 
authentication. 
Given under my hand this 22nd day of August, 1941, within 
sixty days after the entry of the final judgment in said cause. 
0. L. SHACKLEFOR.D, Judge. 
A copy-Teste : 
0. L. SHACKLEFOR.D, Judge. 
CLER.K'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing report of the testimony and evidence, exhibits, 
instructions, motions, objections, and exceptions, and other 
incidents of the trial of the case of Grace Parker v. Peoples 
Life Insurance Company of Washington, D. C., together with 
the original exhibits therein referred to, all of which have 
1been duly authenticated by the Judge who presided over the 
trial of said case, were lodged and filed with me as Clerk of 
said Court on the 23rd day of August, 1941. 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., 
Clerk of the Court of Law and Chancery 
for the City of Norfolk, Virginia. 
By: H. L. BULLOCK, D. C. 
page 90 ~ Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Court of Law and Chancery of 
the City of Norfolk. 
I, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, do hereby certify that the fore-
g·oing and anneded is a true transcript of the record in the 
suit of Grace Parker, plaintiff, vs. Peoples Life Insurance 
Company of Wa.shing1:on, D. C., Incorporated, under the laws 
of the United States in tl1e District of Columbia, defendant, 
lately pending in said Court. 
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I further certify that the said copy was not made up and 
completed un~il the plaintiff had had due notice of the mak-
ing of the same and the intention of the defendant to take an 
appeal therein. 
Given under my hand this 29th day of August, 1941. 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., Clerk. 
Fee for this record $13.50. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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